

DOGMATICS I-I Latin Quotations
First Semester Course
Prolegomena to Family
Notes p. 1-288

Some Books

- PA2823 .S36 1976 *Latin Grammar: grammar, vocabularies, and exercises in preparation for the reading of the missal and breviary* by Cora Carroll Scanlon and Charles L. Scanlon ; edited by Newton Thompson.
PA2823 .S37 1976 *Second Latin* by Cora Carroll Scanlon and Charles L. Scanlon.
- PA2823 .N8 1951 *An Introduction to Ecclesiastical Latin*, by Nunn, H. P. V. (Henry Preston Vaughan)
- PA2306 .B413 1994. *A Handbook of Christian Latin: Style, Morphology, and Syntax*, by Albert Blaise.
- BR95 .M86 1985 *Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: drawn principally from Protestant scholastic theology* by Richard A. Muller.
- B765 .T54 D38 1948 *A Lexicon of St. Thomas Aquina:s based on the Summa Theologica and selected passages of his other works*, by Roy J.Deferrari and Sister M. Inviolata Barry, with the technical collaboration of Ignatius McGuinness.

Preparing In general you will receive both the Latin and English text. First try reading a portion of the Latin text to see what you can understand. Then translate the Latin with the help of the English. Then read the Latin again. It might help to mark subjects, objects and main verbs and to join words in phrases with hyphens.

Dogmatic Latin is vernacular medieval Latin not classical Latin.

Chief differences in medieval Latin from classical:

- 1) more abstract and Greek words, compounds and diminutives.
- 2) More dependence on prepositions, less on cases.
- 3) Fewer long sentences. (The dogmaticians heard of this rule, they just did not believe it.)
- 4) Less use of A. c. I.; more *quod, quia, quoniam*.
- 5) Infinitives of purpose and result.
- 6) Shifting use of subjunctive, both more and less.
- 7) Periphrastic verb forms.
- 8) Lots of cognates with theological English.
- 9) Flexible spelling.

Pronunciation:

Prae and coelum—vowel as in fate.

Certus and cibus—c as ch before i and e.

Gens and agit—g as in gentle before i and e.

Agnus and ignis—gn as canyon.

Miser—s as s never z.

Scio and ascendere—sc=sh before i and e.

Th=t. ti=tsi, gratia.

Quotations from various dogmaticians and church fathers are from the dogmatics notes. The endnote numbers correspond to the numbers in the earlier LOGOS version of the notes. They are non-consecutive since some quotations have been omitted. Quotations from the Triglotta are endnoted with lower case Roman numerals. Quotations from the Vulgate are endnoted with letters. All three types of notes are integrated into one collection of consecutive endnotes. When one is working on-screen with the file Dog Latin Course I.doc, the English translation will pop up in a window when the cursor is placed on the endnote number. The computer file can be reformatted to show footnotes.

Week 1

Prolegomena

Calov: Finis theologiae absolute ultimus est gloria Dei, secundum quid ultimus salus hominum. Medius est tum internus, hominis perductio ad fidem et salutem, tum externus, fides salvifica.¹

Quenstedt: Sumitur denique vox theologiae vel οὐσιωδῶς essentialiter, absolute et habitualiter pro notitia, quae in mente habetur et animo hominis inhaeret, sive quatenus est habitus animi; vel συμβεβηκότως accidentaliter, relate, systematice, quatenus est doctrina vel disciplina, quae docetur et discitur, aut libris continetur. Illa vocis acceptio est primaria, haec secundaria. Theologia enim πρῶτως, vel principaliter dicitur habitus theologicus, δευτέρως vero ac minus principaliter doctrina, oratio, vel etiam liber et systema, theologiam exhibens.²

Calov: Genus theologiae remotum est habitus (He 5:14). Propinquum est habitus practicus (Jn 5:34; Ro 15:4; 2 Tm 3:15), quia finis theologorum et theologiae non est nuda cognitio, sed praxis, perductio scilicet hominum ad salutem (2 Tm 3:16,17; 1 Tm 4:16). Non ergo vel habitus theoreticus est, in sola contemplatione acquiescens, nedum et theoreticus et practicus simul, quod est, cum impossibile sit, differentias oppositas contradictorie, vel saltem habentes contradictionem necessario annexam, in una eademque specie concurrere; et quidquid in theologia tractatur, non alia ratione ibi proponatur, quam ut ad praxin dirigatur, neque ei fini divinitus quicquam revelatum sit, ut in sola cognitione ultimo subsistatur, sed ut ad praxin ordinetur, ad beatam nempe Dei fruitionem. Theologia est habitus practicus, probatur a munere et officio theologorum (Is 61:1,2; Lk 1:16,17; Ac 26:17,18), a fine theologiae practico (Jn 20:31; 2 Tm 3:15,16), a mediis; quaecunque disciplina tradit media practica, quibus homo ad aeternam salutem

deduci debet, quae unice occupatur, ut illa media obtineantur, illa mere est practica.³

Augustine: Fecisti nos, Domine, ad te, et inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te.⁷

Week Two Sources of Doctrine

Preface to Book of Concord : ¹ Credimus, confitemur et docemus unicam regulam et normam, secundum quam omnia dogmata omnesque doctores aestimari et iudicari oporteat, nullam omnino aliam esse quam prophetica et apostolica scripta cum Veteris tum Novi Testamenti, sicut scriptum est Ps. 119, 105: Lucerna pedibus meis Verbum tuum et lumen semitis meis . Et divus Paulus inquit Gal. 1, 8: Etiamsi angelus de coelo aliud praedicet evangelium, anathema sit.

² Reliqua vero sive patrum sive neotericorum scripta, quocumque veniant nomine, sacris litteris nequaquam sunt aequiparanda, sed universa illis ita subiicienda sunt, ut alia ratione non recipiantur nisi testium loco, qui doceant, quod etiam post apostolorum tempora et in quibus partibus orbis doctrina illa prophetarum et apostolorum sincerior conservata sit.

⁷ Hoc modo luculentum discrimen inter sacras Veteris et Novi Testamenti litteras et omnia aliorum scripta retinetur, et sola Sacra Scriptura iudex, norma et regula agnoscitur, ad quam ceu ad Lydium lapidem omnia dogmata exigenda sunt et iudicanda, an pia an impia, an vera an vero falsa sint.

⁸ Cetera autem Symbola et alia scripta, quorum paulo ante mentionem fecimus, non obtinent auctoritatem iudicis; haec enim dignitas solis sacris litteris debetur; sed duntaxat pro religione nostra testimonium dicunt eamque explicant ac ostendunt, quomodo singulis temporibus sacrae litterae in articulis controversis in ecclesia Dei a doctoribus, qui tum vixerunt, intellectae et explicatae fuerint, et quibus rationibus dogmata cum Sacra Scriptura pugnantia reiecta et condemnata sint.¹

Augustine: In his, quae aperte posita sunt in scriptura, inveniuntur illa omnia, quae continent fidem moresque vivendi, spem scilicet et charitatem.—Si quis sive de Christo, sive de ejus ecclesia, sive de quacunque alia re, quae pertinet ad fidem vitamque nostram, non dicam, si nos, sed quod Paulus (Ga 1:8–9) adjecit, si angelus de coelo vobis annuntiaverit, praeterquam quod in scripturis legalibus et evangelicis acceptistis, anathema sit.—Auferantur de medio chartae nostrae, procedat in medium codex Dei.¹⁰

Augustine: In ecclesia non valet: “Hoc ego dico; hoc tu dicis, hoc ille dicit;” sed, “Haec dicit Dominus.”¹¹

Athanasius: Sufficiunt sanctae ac divinitus inspiratae scripturae ad omnem instructionem veritatis.¹²

Boniface VIII, Unam Sanctam: Porro subesse Romano pontifici omni humanae creaturae declaramus, dicimus, definimus, et pronunciamus, omnino esse de necessitate salutis.¹⁴

Vat I, Sess. IV, 4, Docemus et divinitus revelatum dogma esse definimus: Romanum Pontificem, cum ex Cathedra loquitur, i.e. cum omnium Christianorum pastoris et doctoris munere fungens pro suprema sua apostolica auctoritate doctrinam de fide vel moribus ab universa Ecclesia tenendam definit, per assistentiam divinam ipsi in beato Petro promissam ea infallibilitate pollere, qua divinus Redemptor Ecclesiam suam in definienda doctrina de fide vel moribus instructam esse voluit.¹⁵

Trid., Sess. IV: Synodus ... omnes libros tam Veteris quam Novi Testamenti ... nec non traditiones ipsas, tum ad fidem tum ad mores pertinentes, tamquam vel ore tenus a Christo vel a Spiritu Sancto dictatas, et continua successione in Ecclesia Catholica conservatas, pari pietatis affectu ac reverentia suscipit et veneratur.¹⁶

Walch: Quid de modo subscribendi cum restrictione sit statuendum ... porro ex eo videndum est, quod eiusmodi admissa formula nihil obstat, quo minus quis Alcorano, Catechismo Racoviensi possit subscribere. 1) Subscriptio cum restrictione (quatenus) indoli huius iusiurandi plane repugnat. Qui iurat cum restrictione, re ipsa haud praestat iusiurandum religionis, nihil promittit de doctrina, quatenus ad libros symbolicos spectat. 2) Adversatur subscriptio cum restrictione ... fini iusiurandi, ex parte cum magistratus, qui id postulat, tum illius, qui eius religione est obstringendus.... Qui ita cum conditione iuravit, licentiam sibi tribuere potest, doctrinam in symbolis propositam, uti libet, sine metu deserendi.¹⁷

Week Three

Revelation of God

Natural Knowledge of God

Quenstedt: Notitia Dei naturalis est duplex: una ἐμφυτος sive naturae et mentibus hominum in ipso ortu suo impressa, insita et implantata, qua homo ex principiis secum natis, tanquam imaginis divinae rudibus quibusdam et reliquiis sine discursu et mentis operatione Deum cognoscit; altera ἐπίκτητος dicitur, seu acquisita, quia ex insitis naturae principiis per ratiocinationem et accuratam creaturarum contemplationem acquiritur.²²

Calov: Naturalis Dei notitia est partim insita, partim acquisita. Illa, qua homo per naturam Deum cognoscit, vi reliquiarum habitus sapientiae in prima creatione menti hominis implantatae. Haec, quae consideratione rerum creaturarum ac universali gubernatione mundi discursus beneficio colligitur, Deum creatorem, conservatorem ac moderatorem esse rerum creaturarum.²³

Chemnitz: Vere loquendo; aut nulla aut imperfecta, aut languida est (sc. notitia Dei nat.). Nulla, quia de gratuita promissione remissionis peccatorum nihil novit tota philosophia.... Imperfecta, quia gentes aliquam tantum particulam legis noverunt, de interioribus vero cultibus primae tabulae nihil certi vel novit vel statuit ratio.... Languida, quia, etiamsi impressum est humanis mentibus esse Deum et praecipere obedientiam

iuxta discrimen honestorum et turpium, tamen assensio non tantum languida est, sed horrendis dubitationibus saepe excutitur.²⁴

Quenstedt: Indicat enim apostolus, quid per accidens ad notitias istas ob hominum abusum et neglectum consequutum sit, sc. ut sint inexcusabiles, vultque omnes gentes convincere, quod Deum non glorificarint ut Deum etsi τὸ γινῶστων τοῦ θεοῦ manifestum in illis fuerit. ... Licet enim notitiae illae naturales non sint sufficientes ad perfectam Dei cognitionem, neque per se sint efficaces ad conversionem, sunt tamen sufficientes ad convincendam hominum impietatem, quod sc. ne id quidem, quod notitiae illae dictitabant, fecerint, sed potius illis abusi fuerint.²⁵

Hollaz: Possunt dari athei speculative tales, non per naturam, sed per iustam Dei desertionem et diaboli excaecationem; non per totalem eradicationem luminis naturae quoad habitum, sed per suffocationem quoad actum et exercitium; non per totum vitae spatium et permanenter, sed tantum per quendam paroxysmum transeuntem ad aliquod tempus. Neque enim lex naturae patitur, ut rata et firma sententia alicui inhaereat: non esse Deum. Quamquam enim mens hominis impii lethargo quasi sopiatur, ut de Deo non cogitet, nullus tamen potest dari, in quo tandem conscientia se non vindicet et vel in ipsa morte neglecti Dei ipsum accuset.²⁶

Clement of Alexandria: Multae sunt viae ad salutem.²⁸

Maldonatus: Gentiles poterant servata lege naturae omnium confessione salvi esse, absque scripta lege.²⁹

Bellarmino: Adde, quod Patres docent, gentiles, etsi vulgo plures deos colerent, tamen unum Deum naturaliter cognoscere potuisse, sicut reipsa philosophi unum Deum recognoverunt, et ea ex parte quasi naturaliter Christiani fuerunt.³⁰

Baier: Equidem inter Christianos supponi magis, quam probari debere (sc. esse Deum), videri potest; quia tamen non solum cum atheis, verum etiam alias ob corruptionem naturae cum dubitationibus mentium nostrarum decertandum est, ideo non sunt negligenda, quae existentiam Dei probant.³²

Gerhard: Videri alicui poterat, quaestionem illam in ecclesia esse otiosam, cum omnibus notum et concessum sit, esse Deum, nec ulla gens tam barbara sit, quae Deum esse eundemque colendum esse, neget, licet, quomodo colendus sit, ignoret.... Sed nihilominus statuendum sive quod sit Deus, probandum esse: 1) ad eorum, qui Deum esse negant, confutationem ... 2) ad fidei nostrae confirmationem ... At haec fides ex verbo Dei haurienda, et ejusdem meditatione confirmanda. In gravibus et seriis tentationibus, inquit Chemnitius, omnes sumus vel Epicuræi, vel Stoici; confirmandus igitur animus consideratione dicatorum, quae testantur esse Deum, et providam rerum humanarum curam eundem gerere: 3) ad naturalis notitiae perfectionem.³³

Apology, IV, 22-28] Nos autem de iustitia rationis sic sentimus, quod Deus requirat eam, et quod propter mandatum Dei necessario sint facienda honesta opera, quae

Decalogus praecipit, iuxta illud Gal. 3, 24: Lex est paedagogus; item 1 Tim. 1, 9: Lex est iniustus posita . Vult enim Deus coerceri carnales illa civili disciplina, et ad hanc conservandam dedit leges, litteras, doctrinam, magistratus, poenas. Et potest hanc iustitiam utcunque ratio suis viribus efficere, quamquam saepe vincitur imbecillitate naturali et impellente diabolo ad manifesta flagitia. Quamquam autem huic iustitiae rationis libenter tribuimus suas laudes; nullum enim maius bonum habet haec natura corrupta, et recte inquit Aristoteles: Neque hesperum neque luciferum formosiorum esse iustitia [Aristoteles, Ethicorum ad Nicomachum, lib. V. c. 3:], ac Deus etiam ornat eam corporalibus praemiis: tamen non debet cum contumelia Christi laudari. Falsum est enim, quod per opera nostra mereamur remissionem peccatorum. Falsum est et hoc, quod homines reputentur esse iusti coram Deo propter iustitiam rationis. Falsum est et hoc, quod ratio propriis viribus possit Deum supra omnia diligere et legem Dei facere, videlicet vere timere Deum, vere statuere, quod Deus exaudiat, velle obedire Deo in morte et aliis ordinationibus Dei, non concupiscere aliena etc., etsi civilia opera efficere ratio potest. Falsum est et hoc et contumeliosum in Christum, quod non peccent homines facientes praecepta Dei sine gratia. ⁱⁱ

God's Essence And Attributes

Week Four Essence and Attributes in General

Gerhard: Deus est ipsum esse subsistens, omnibus modis indeterminatum. Deus est mera et simplicissima essentia. In Deo idem est esse et velle et intelligere. ³⁵

Calov: Deus non per esse simpliciter, sed per τὸ esse summe actuale distinguitur ab aliis. ³⁶

Quenstedt: Est Deus a se ipso, non positive, per positivum influxum, quasi se ipsum produxerit a nonesse ad esse; sed negative, per negationem influxus ab alio, quod scilicet non sit ab alio ente productus. ³⁷

Hollaz : Essentia et perfectiones Dei nullos habent terminos. ³⁹

Quenstedt: Infinitus est Deus non ratione quantitativae extensionis, cum omnis quantitatis expers sit, sed ratione essentiae ac perfectionis, Ps 145:3. Magnitudinis ejus non est finis. ⁴⁰

Gerhard: Per infinitatem intelligitur ... quod Deus nec tempore, nec loco, nec ulla re alia finiri possit, sed sua natura et essentia, actu, simpliciter, per se et absolute sit infinitus. ⁴¹

Gerhard: Est autem Deus summe unus: ut enim aliquid sit maxime unum, oportet ut sit maxime ens et maxime indivisum. Deus autem est ipsum Esse subsistens omnibus modis indeterminatum: item nec actu nec potentia dividi potest. Ergo Deus est summe et

maxime unus.⁴²

Quenstedt: Unitas Dei est, qua ipse essentia indivisus non tantum, sed et ἀπλῶς et absolute indivisibilis est ac incommunicabilis per quandam sui multiplicationem ... quae omnem omnino divisibilitatem aut communicabilitatem essentiae divinae ad plura ejusdem rationis individua excludit.⁴³

Gerhard: Essentia divina est simplicissima, expers omnis compositionis, admixtionis ac divisionis, adeoque omnium accidentium.⁴⁴

Calov: Ex unitate divina redundat simplicitas Dei, qua Deus omnis compositionis realis expers est.⁴⁵

Scotus Erigena: 1. Natura creatrix non creata (God);-2. Natura creatrix creata (ideas);-3. Natura creata non creans (Matter);-4. Natura nec creata nec creans (God as the final aim).⁴⁶

Servetus: Deum in lapide lapidem, in trunco truncum esse, et sic in aliis.⁴⁷

Quenstedt: Attributa divina non notant aliquid essentiae divinae superadditum, sed sunt tantum inadaequati conceptus essentiae infinite perfectae. Est essentia divina instar incomprehensibilis infinitarum perfectionum omnium oceani, ad quem uno simplicique conceptu exhauriendum non sufficit intellectus humanus, ideoque conceptibus variis sorbillatim quasi haurit aliquid ex illa infinitate.⁴⁸

Augustine: sine qualitate bonum, sine quantitate magnum, sine indigentia creatorem, sine situ praesentem, ... sine loco ubique totum ...;—Deus est essentia invisibilis, omni creaturae incomprehensibilis ... omnem creaturam instar puncti in se continens;—Deus est substantia creatrix, sine labore regens, et sine onere continens mundum.⁴⁹

Occam: Omnem distinctionem esse solum in nominibus.⁵¹

Quenstedt: Si attributa ratione tantum inter se differunt, voces illae, sapiens, justus, misericors, cum de Deo efferuntur, synonymae erunt, sicut apud nos gladius et ensis, sed hoc absurdum. Ergo sola ratione non differunt. Non est par ratio; gladius et ensis distinguuntur ratione ratiocinante, attributa divina ratione ratiocinata, quae habet fundamentum in re.⁵²

Hollaz: Attributa divina ab essentia divina et a se invicem distinguuntur non nominaliter, neque realiter, sed formaliter, secundum nostrum concipiendi modum, non sine certo distinctionis fundamento.⁵³

Quenstedt: Attributa divina sunt ipsa Dei essentia, per plures inadaequatos conceptus nobis repraesentata. Sic Infinitas Dei est ipsa essentia divina, apprehensa ut carens omni termino et finitione. Omnipotentia est ipsa essentia Dei ut carens omni obstaculo in agendo. Ibid. Distinguendum inter conceptum objectivum, qui est ipsum objectum

conceptum, et inter conceptum formalem, qui est qualitas ab intellectu nostro facta, repraesentans rem cognitam per modum ideae vel imaginis impressae. Ibid: Attributa Dei essentialia neque ab essentia divina neque inter se realiter aut ex natura rei, ut res plane diversae, aut unius ejusdemque simplicis rei duae pluresve quidditates, aut diversi modi, sed ratione tantum distinguuntur.⁵⁴

Gerhard: Attributa divina in se ac per se considerata sunt realiter et simplicissime unum cum divina essentia.⁵⁵

Quenstedt: Differt itaque immensitas ab omnipraesentia; illa est attributum absolutum, haec respectivum ... cum non solum essentiae divinae propinquitatem, sive adessentiam Dei ad creaturas, sed etiam operationem quandam seu operosum dominium importet; illa aeterna est, haec nequaquam, sed cum creaturis coepit.⁵⁹

Quenstedt: Attributorum duo sunt genera: quaedam essentiam divinam describunt absolute et in se citra respectum ad operationem, dicunturque immanentia, ἀνεέργητα seu quiescentia, quae scil. non sunt ordinata ad aliquos actus, ut immensitas, aeternitas, spiritualitas etc. Quaedam essentiam divinam describunt respective, ratione ἐνεργείας, dicunturque ἐνεργητικά seu operativa et ad extra se exserentia, sive quae ad certas operationes directa esse cognoscuntur, ut sunt potentia, scientia, iustitia, misericordia.⁶⁰

Individual Attributes

Week Five

Immutability Eternity Goodness

Quenstedt: *Immutabilitas* est perpetua essentiae divinae et omnium eius perfectionum identitas, negans omnem omnino motum, cum physicum tum ethicum.⁶¹

Baier: Immutabilitas in eo consistit, quod Deus nulli mutationi neque secundum esse (qua ratione Deus est immortalis et incorruptibilis) neque secundum accidentia, nec secundum locum, nec secundum voluntatem aut propositum est obnoxious.⁶²

Gerhard: Mutat enim facta sua immutabili manente ipsius voluntate.⁶³

Baier: *Aeternitas* Dei, absolute sic dicta (non enim accipitur pro tempore diuturno) significat existentiam seu durationem Dei permanentem sine principio et fine, omnique successione aut vicissitudine.⁶⁴

Quenstedt: ut praesens sive τὸ νῦν non sit proprie tempus, sed initium futuri et finis praeteriti, quibus omnibus coexistit aeternitas. perpetuum νῦν idque fixum non fluxum.⁶⁵

Gerhard: Deus cum sit *summum bonum*, ideo amat se ipsum ut summum bonum. In homine amor sui ipsius est vitiosus et damnabilis, quia homo non est summum bonum, sed in Deo debet quaerere summum bonum, eique unice adhaerere. Deus autem se ipsum amat, non tamen ut est ipse, sed ut est summum bonum, si enim aliud esset majus et

praestantius bonum, tum illud, non se deligeret, sicut “Theologia Germanica” hac de re late disserit.⁶⁶

Gerhard: Pater in divinis diligit filium ut substantialem suam imaginem (Mt 3:17; 17:5; Jn 3:35; 5:20; 17:24). Filius diligit patrem, utpote ex cujus corde ante saecula natus (Jn 14:31). Spiritus sanctus est substantialis patris et filii amor, qui procedit ab utroque.⁶⁷

Calov: *Bonitas* Dei est, qua Deus essentialiter bonus, immo summum bonum est.⁶⁸

Gerhard: Quod nihil illi desit, quod nulla alia re extra se opus habeat, quod nec consilio, nec auxilio, nec sapientia, nec potentia in agendo indigeat, nec in essendo, nec in operando ab alio dependeat.⁶⁹

Gerhard: Deus non solum in se bonus est, sed etiam bonitatem suam extra se diffundit et communicat, quae respectu hujus communicationis dicitur benignitas.⁷⁰

Cotta: Quando de bonitate Dei sermo est, distingui debet bonitas ejus essentialis ac metaphysica a morali, quam vocant. Per bonitatem essentialem Dei intelligitur ipsa ejus perfectio, quatenus scil. in Deo ea omnia, quae enti perfectissimo conveniunt, deprehendere licet, Lk 18:19. Per bonitatem vero moralem denotatur studium seu inclinatio supremi numinis creaturis bona quaevis conferendi ... atque hanc bonitatem, quae respectum habet ad miseriam in creaturis, appellare alias solemus misericordiam Dei.⁷¹

Calov speaks correctly of: bonitas, qua Deus essentialiter bonus immo summum bonum est and that it affinis est sanctitas, qua essentialiter sanctus immo ipsa sanctitas est.⁷²

Calov: Ex perfectione divina consequitur majestas, quia ita perfectus est, ut vere magnus sit Deus.⁷³

Calov: Consequitur et beatitudo, qua beatissimus est, immo ipsa beatitudo Ps 73:25; 1 Tm 1:11; cf. 6:15.⁷⁴

Gerhard: Quando ergo Deus dicitur beatus, intelligitur 1. quod bonis omnibus adfluat; 2. quod sit ab omnibus malis liber; 3. quod sit immutabiliter beatus; 4. quod essentialiter ac sua natura beatus sit, immo ipsa beatitudo (if blessedness were an accident, it could not be lost); 5. quod a se ipso et per se ipsum beatus sit, non autem participatam ab alio beatitudinem habeat; 6. quod Deus suam perfectionem ac beatitudinem per intellectum plene cognoscat et per voluntatem amet, inque ea quiete et pacate acquiescat, ex qua acquiescentia oritur gaudium, quo Deus se ipso tanquam summo bono ex operibus suis omnibus valde bonis delectatur, supra quam dici nulla potest vel cogitari; 7. quod sit sibi sufficiens, nullum externum bonum adeptus, nullius boni egens.⁷⁵

Psalm 90 (Vulgate) Domine refugium tu factus es nobis in generatione et generatione
² priusquam montes fierent et formaretur terra et orbis a saeculo usque in saeculum tu es
Deus ³ ne avertas hominem in humilitatem et dixisti convertimini filii hominum

⁴quoniam mille anni ante oculos tuos tamquam dies hesternae quae praeteriit et custodia in nocte ⁵ quae pro nihilo habentur eorum anni erunt.

Domine habitaculum tu factus es nobis in generatione et generatione ² antequam montes nascerentur et parturiretur terra et orbis a saeculo et usque in saeculum tu es ³ convertes hominem usque ad contritionem et dices revertimini filii Adam ⁴ quia mille anni in oculis tuis sicut dies hesternae quae pertransiit et vigilia nocturna ⁵ percutiente te eos somnium erunt.^a

Psalm 90:5 BHS : זְרִמָּתָם שָׁנָה יְהִיוּ בַּבֶּקֶר כְּחֻצִיר יַחֲלֶף

Week Six Presence, Knowledge

Quenstedt: Differt itaque *immensitas* ab omnipraesentia; illa est attributum absolutum, haec respectivum ... cum non solum essentiae divinae propinquitatem, sive adessentiam Dei ad creaturas, sed etiam operationem quandam seu operosum dominium importet; illa aeterna est, haec nequaquam, sed cum creaturis coepit. (Cave!)⁷⁶

Decisio Saxonica: Duo ad plenam definitionem praesentiae Dei requiri: Primo adessentiam infiniti et immensi Dei; secundo praesentis Dei operationem.⁷⁷

Gerhard: Est *praesentia* illocalis, impartibilis, rationi nostrae incomprehensibilis, efficax et operosa, omnia instar minutissimi puncti in se continens.⁷⁸

Gerhard: Quod Deus ubique praesens sit non per essentiae suae multiplicationem, est enim ὁλως ὁλον τί ens simplicissimum, ac proinde ubicunque est, totus est. Nec per essentiae suae divisionem ... nec per extensionem ... nec per commixtionem.⁷⁹

Cicero: Aperta simplexque mens, nulla re adjuncta, qua sentire possit, fugere intelligentiae nostrae vim et notionem videtur.⁸⁰

Some awkward expressions of Tertullian: Omne quod est, corpus est sui generis, nihil est incorporale, nisi quod non est.—Quis negabit, Deum corpus esse, etsi Deus spiritus est? Spiritus enim corpus sui generis in sua effigie.⁸¹

Servetus: Deum in lapide esse vere et proprie lapidem, et in trunco truncum, et sic in aliis.⁸²

Carpov: (denying the deist view) Non potest fieri, quin Deus totus cuilibet enti praesens sit,⁸³

Vorstius: Nusquam scriptum legimus, Deum substantiam simpliciter immensam et totam reipsa in omnibus locis praesentem esse, imo non pauca, quae contrarium sensum habere videntur, passim occurrunt. jam patet, ex scripturis immensitatem aut ubiunitatem essentiae divinae solide probari non posse. Verum quidem est, Deum omnia in omnibus

operari; non tamen sequitur, Deum immediate illic sua substantia adesse, ubicunque operatur, quia per causas medias sive physicas sive hyperphysicas operari potest, ut rex aliquis per suos ministros. Substantialiter in illo altissimo coelo tamquam in solio aut palatio suo residet, sic tamen, ut virtualiter etiam κατ' ἐνέργειαν suam in terra versetur. Mirum videtur esse paradoxum, Deum sic omnis quantitatis expertem esse, ut totus substantialiter sit in re qualibet, etiam minima.—Sane de loco et locali praesentia, quin Deo vero et recte attribui possit, minime dubitandum videtur.⁸⁴

Gerhard: Haec immensitas et essentialis Dei omnipraesentia ita intelligenda est: Quod Deus non tantum virtute et efficacia, nec tantum visione et scientia, sed etiam tota et individua sua essentia sit omnibus rebus praesens, neque enim tantum potentia et scientia, sed etiam essentia est immensus et infinitus.⁸⁵

Calov: *Scientia* Dei credenda est vere immensa atque infinita, vi cujus Deus omnia uno intuitu ab aeterno scit, quae sunt, fuerunt, aut futura, respectu nostri, sunt. Ibid.: Omniscientia Dei est, qua Deus omnia scit, quaecunque fuerunt, sunt et erunt, ut et quae esse et non esse possunt. Quod ad modum scientiae, Deus videt novitque omnia scientia infinita et immutabili, non in tempore demum, sed ab aeterno; non discursive aut successive, sed uno simplici et aeterno intelligendi actu.⁸⁶

Calov: Scientia Dei naturalis est qua se ipsum atque omnia possible novit.⁸⁷

Augustine: Quid est praescientia nisi scientia futurorum? Quid autem futurum est Deo, qui omnia supergreditur tempora? Si enim in scientia res ipsas habet, non sunt ei futurae, sed praesentes, ac per hoc non jam praescientia, sed tantum scientia dici potest.⁸⁸

Gerhard: Quod praescientia Deo tribuitur, id fit respectu nostri; ipsi enim omnia sunt praesentia, quae nobis adhuc futura.⁸⁹

Osiander: ut in Deo non habet locum postscientia, etsi noverit praeterita, ita, accurate loquendo, sub futurorum in tempore cognitione Deo tribui non potest praescientia.⁹⁰

F. Socinus: God knows “omnia quae sua natura scibilia sunt”, i.e. after the event—at least, He has no foreknowledge of the evil: Nulla ratio, nullum Scripturae testimonium proferri potest, ex quo aperte colligitur, Deum mala ex voluntatibus hominum dependentia scivisse, antequam fierent.⁹¹

Calvin “Nec alia ratione quae futura sunt praevidet, nisi quia ut fierent decreverit.”⁹³

Gerhard: Distinguendum est inter necessitatem consequentis (quam alias vocant absolutam, praecedentem, simplicem), quae oritur ex necessaria causae cum effectu ac intrinseca terminorum connexionem: et inter necessitatem consequentiae (quam vocant hypotheticam, sequentem, comitantem, conditionalem, ex suppositione), quae oritur ex actu existentiae ab ipsa positione effectus, quia omne, quod est, eo ipso, quod est, necesse est esse. Hac posteriori necessitatis specie respectu divinae praescientiae necessaria sunt, quae ex causis contingenter et libere agentibus fiunt, atque haec necessitas non tollit

libertatem, sed potius praesupponit.⁹⁴

Augustine: Sicut tu tua memoria non cogis facta esse, quae praeterierunt, sic Deus praescientia sua non cogit facienda, quae futura sunt.⁹⁵

Augustine: Atque ita, qui omnium rerum causas praescivit, profecto in eis causis etiam nostras voluntates ignorare non potuit, quas nostrorum operum causas esse praescivit. Quomodo ergo ordo causarum, qui praescienti Deo certus est, id efficit, ut nihil fiat in nostra voluntate, cum in ipso causarum ordine magnum habeant locum nostrae voluntates?⁹⁶

Week Seven **Love, Holiness, Righteousness**

Quenstedt: *Amor Dei* est, quo ipse cum objecto amabili se suaviter unit.⁹⁷

Quenstedt: Amore complacentiae amat Deus omnes res creatas, vel potius bonum suum, quod cum illis communicavit; amore benevolentiae peculiariter amat homines, propter quos filium suum in carnem misit et in mortem tradidit, vocatur uno verbo φιλανθρωπία; amore autem amicitiae prosequitur fideles et in gratiam receptos.⁹⁹

Tertullian: Bonitas nisi justitia regatur, ut justa sit, non erit bonitas, si injusta sit. Nihil enim bonum, quod injustum: bonum autem omne quod justum.¹⁰⁰

Quenstedt: *Sanctitas* Dei est summa omnisque omnino labis aut vitii expers in Deo puritas; munditiem et puritatem debitam exigens a creaturis; sive, qua Deus summe purus, mundus et sanctus est, omnisque puritatis et sanctitatis in creaturis autor.¹⁰¹

Buddeus: quando Deus se ipsum amore purissimo amare concipitur, ut simul ab omni imperfectione remotus, secretus, separatus censeatur, amor ille vocatur sanctitas.¹⁰²

Baier: Deus, qui legem a superiore latam non habet, ipse sibi lex est.¹⁰³

Baier: Sanctitatem vocamus, et importat rectitudinem divinae voluntatis, qua omnia, quae recta atque bona sunt, aeternae suae legi conformiter vult.¹⁰⁴

Calov: *Justitia* Dei est, qua Deus justus est retributor boni atque vindex mali.¹⁰⁵

Quenstedt: Justitia Dei est summa et immutabilis voluntatis divinae rectitudo, a creatura rationali, quod rectum et justum est, exigens.¹⁰⁶

Gerhard: Erga creaturas justus est tum dispositive, quatenus omnes actiones suas, omnia opera sua ad extra juxta norma aequitatis et justitiae disponit, estque justissimus totius universi gubernator ac dominus; tum distributive, quatenus unicuique creaturae reddit secundum opus suum.¹⁰⁷

Gerhard: Quamvis tum ex naturaliter insito justis et injustis discrimine, tum ex poenis graviora delicta comitantibus ratio humana quodammodo agnoscat, Deum esse justum, quod testantur dicta gentilium de Dei justitia: tamen cognitio illa est imperfecta et languida.¹⁰⁸

Romans 3:20-28 (Vulgate) ²⁰ quia ex operibus legis non iustificabitur omnis caro coram illo per legem enim cognitio peccati ²¹ nunc autem sine lege iustitia Dei manifestata est testificata a lege et prophetis ²² iustitia autem Dei per fidem Iesu Christi super omnes qui credunt non enim est distinctio ²³ omnes enim peccaverunt et egent gloriam Dei ²⁴ iustificati gratis per gratiam ipsius per redemptionem quae est in Christo Iesu ²⁵ quem proposuit Deus propitiationem per fidem in sanguine ipsius ad ostensionem iustitiae suae propter remissionem praecedentium delictorum ²⁶ in sustentatione Dei ad ostensionem iustitiae eius in hoc tempore ut sit ipse iustus et iustificans eum qui ex fide est Iesu ²⁷ ubi est ergo gloriatio exclusa est per quam legem factorum non sed per legem fidei ²⁸ arbitramur enim iustificari hominem per fidem sine operibus legis.^b

Romans 5:1-5 (Vulgate) Iustificati igitur ex fide pacem habeamus ad Deum per Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum ² per quem et accessum habemus fide in gratiam istam in qua stamus et gloriamur in spe gloriae filiorum Dei ³ non solum autem sed et gloriamur in tribulationibus scientes quod tribulatio patientiam operatur ⁴ patientia autem probationem probatio vero spem ⁵ spes autem non confundit quia caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum Sanctum qui datus est nobis.^c

Week Eight Omnipotence

Brochman: *Omnipotentiam* Deo ubi tribuo, tantum potentiam ipsi assigno, ut multo plura quam ulla creatura capere possit, facere queat, adeo ut quicquid facere vult, nullo labore et negotio facere possit, invitis etiam omnibus rebus creatis.¹⁰⁹

Gerhard: Infinita est potentia Dei I) in se et per se seu natura sua, sicut Deus ipse, cuius essentiale idioma est, quod infinitus adpellatur; II) respectu objectorum, quae non tantum jam facta varia sunt et innumera, sed etiam infinita adhuc alia ab ipso fieri possent, si sapientiae ejus placeret; III) ratione modi agendi, quia nunquam tam intensive et efficaciter agit Deus, ut non intensius et efficacius agere possit.¹¹⁰

Plinius: Deum omnipotentem esse negat ex eo, quia mori et fallere non potest, nec factum infectum reddere potest.¹¹¹

Hollaz: Attributum divinum, quo Deus efficere potest omne, quod fieri possibile est et in Deo nullam importat imperfectionem.¹¹²

Scherzer: Sunt sophismata quibus definitio rei tollitur.—Si enim Deus mentiretur, moreretur, peccaret, Deus non esset; si creatura infinitam perfectionem haberet, creatura non esset; si praeteritum non praeteriisset, praeteritum non esset; si dies crastina hodie

existeret, hodie non esset.¹¹³

Gerhard: Realiter potentiam a voluntate non distingui, manifestum est ex essentiae divinae simplicitate, quaestio vero est, an ratione distinguatur? Durandus et alii adfirmant... Sed rectius statuitur, ne quidem ratione potentiam a voluntate in Deo distingui. I) Quia scriptura sacra voluntatem Dei nobis proponit ut causam omnium rerum (Ps CXV,3; Ps CXLVIII,5; Esaj. XLVI,10). II) Imperfectionis est, quod in creatura intellectuali distinguitur potentia executiva a voluntate, sed a Deo removenda omnis imperfectio.¹¹⁴

Abelard's argument: Deus solum potest facere, quod ab aeterno praescivit et decrevit se aliquando facturum. Sed illa solum, quae aliquando facit, praescivit et decrevit, se facturum.¹¹⁵

Psalm 139 (Vulgate)

IN FINEM DAVID PSALMUS	PRO VICTORIA DAVID CANTICUM
² Domine probasti me et cognovisti me tu cognovisti sessionem meam et surrectionem meam	² Domine investigasti me et cognovisti tu cognovisti sessionem meam et surrectionem meam
³ intellexisti cogitationes meas de longe semitam meam et funiculum meum investigasti	³ intellexisti malum meum de longe semitam meam et accubitionem meam eventilasti
⁴ et omnes vias meas praevidisti quia non est sermo in lingua mea	⁴ et omnes vias meas intellexisti quia non est eloquium in lingua mea
⁵ ecce Domine tu cognovisti omnia novissima et antiqua tu formasti me et posuisti super me manum tuam	⁵ ecce Domine nosti omnia retrorsum et ante formasti me et posuisti super me manum tuam
⁶ mirabilis facta est scientia tua ex me confortata est non potero ad eam	⁶ super me est scientia et excelsior est non potero ad eam
¹³ quia tu possedisti renes meos suscepisti me de utero matris meae	¹³ quoniam tu possedisti renes meos orsusque es me in utero matris meae ^d
¹⁴ confitebor tibi quia terribiliter magnificatus es mirabilia opera tua et anima mea cognoscit nimis	¹⁴ confitebor tibi quoniam terribiliter magnificasti me mirabilia opera tua et anima mea novit nimis
¹⁵ non est occultatum os meum a te quod fecisti in occulto et substantia mea in inferioribus terrae	¹⁵ non sunt operta ossa mea a te quibus factus sum in abscondito imaginatus sum in novissimis terrae

¹⁶ imperfectum meum viderunt oculi tui et in libro tuo omnes scribentur die formabuntur et nemo in eis

¹⁷ mihi autem nimis honorificati sunt amici tui Deus nimis confirmati sunt principatus eorum

¹⁸ dinumerabo eos et super harenam multiplicabuntur exsurrexi et adhuc sum tecum

²³ proba me Deus et scito cor meum interroga me et cognosce semitas meas

²⁴ et vide si via iniquitatis in me est et deduc me in via aeterna

¹⁶ informem adhuc me viderunt oculi tui et in libro tuo omnes scribentur dies formatae sunt et non est una in eis

¹⁷ mihi autem quam honorabiles facti sunt amici tui Deus quam fortes pauperes eorum

¹⁸ dinumerabo eos et harena plures erunt evigilavi et adhuc sum tecum

²³ scrutare me Deus et cognosce cor meum proba me et scito cogitationes meas

²⁴ et vide si via idoli in me est et deduc me in via aeterna ^d

Week Nine Will of God

Calov: Voluntatis attributum praecipuum est libertas, qua Deus non ex necessitate naturae, sed libere vult omnia alia extra se, ita ut possit eadem non-velle.¹¹⁷

Gerhard: Deus est essentia liberrime agens. Ut deo tribuitur intellectus, ita quoque voluntas, quae est libere agendi facultas atque principium actionum imperans.¹¹⁸

Doederlein: Libertas est, quod Deus nulla re alia, quam rationis vi cogatur, nec impedimentis constringatur, cum recta bonaque cupere et exsequi velit.¹¹⁹

Gerhard: Quaedam Deus vult absolute, quaedam conditionaliter. Quae absolute Deus vult, necessario fiunt, quae vero conditionaliter, non nisi conditione posita. Voluntas ergo Dei non excludit arbitrii libertatem in rebus externis in homine, quia causas inferiores, inter quas est arbitrii libertas, non excludit, sed includit, nec praedeterminat voluntatem humanam physica quadam necessitate ad partem unam; sed libertatem eidem naturaliter insitam relinquit, nec affert ejus motui necessitatem quandam antecedentem et a priori, sed generali concursu ad agendum vires agendi donat et conservat.¹²⁰

Gerhard: Deus quaedam vult ex necessitate naturae, quaedam libere. Ex necessitate naturae vult, quae de se ipso vult, nulla re sive extra sive intra se permotus, hoc modo vult se ipsum, suam bonitatem atque gloriam. Libere vult, quae de creaturis vult secundum beneplacitum voluntatis suae, quae poterat et velle et nolle, vult autem ea sine ulla necessitate, praeterquam hypotheseos, quae est propriae immutabilitatis.¹²¹

Augustine: Efficacem seu invictam et omnipotentissimam Dei voluntatem vocat eam, qua statuit, bene agentes remunerare et peccantes punire, quam semper impleri asserit.

Inefficacem vocat, qua vult, omnes bene vivere et neminem peccare.¹²²

Gerhard: Antecedens voluntas est, qua Deus, ut benignissimus pater, omnes homines vult salvos fieri, et ad agnitionem veritatis venire. Consequens voluntas est, qua Deus, ut justissimus iudex, finaliter impenitentes et incredulos vult damnari.¹²³

Gerhard: Quia in aeterna et simplicissima voluntate non datur successio nec actuum voluntatis distinctio.¹²⁴

Gerhard: Sed in illis, quae negotium salutis concernunt, voluntatem quandam arcanam a revelata in verbo non solum diversam, sed eidem etiam adversam statuendam esse, totis viribus negamus, imo id ipsum impium ac blasphemum esse pronunciamus.¹²⁵

Calov: Porro licet Deus peccatum permittat volens, non invitus; voluntas tamen et permissio circa diversa versatur objecta voluntas enim circa permissionem, at permissio circa peccatum est.¹²⁶

Formula of Concord, TD, XI: ^{28]} Si igitur aeternam electionem ad salutem utiliter considerare voluerimus, firmissime et constanter illud retinendum est, quod non tantum praedicatio poenitentiae, verum etiam promissio evangelii sit universalis, hoc est, ad omnes homines pertineat. Eam ob causam Christus, Luc. 24, 47, *iussit praedicari in nomine suo* poenitentiam et remissionem peccatorum in omnes gentes. Deus enim mundum dilexit eique Filium suum unigenitum donavit, Ioh. 3, 16. Christus peccata mundi sustulit, Ioh. 1, 29. Idem carnem suam tradidit pro mundi vita, Ioh. 6, 51. Ipsius sanguis propitiatio est pro totius mundi peccatis, 1 Ioh. [1, 7] 2, 2. Christus dicit Matth. 11, 28: Venite ad me omnes, qui laboratis et onerati estis, et ego reficiam vos. Deus omnia in incredulitate conclusit, ut omnium misereatur, Rom. 11, 32. Non vult Dominus aliquos perire, sed omnes ad poenitentiam reverti, 2 Petr. 3, 9. Idem Dominus omnium, dives in omnes, qui invocant illum, Rom. 10, 12. Iustitia Dei per fidem Iesu Christi venit in omnes et super omnes, qui credunt in eum, Rom. 3, 22. Et haec est voluntas Patris, ut omnes, qui in Christum credunt, vitam aeternam habeant, Ioh. 6, 40. Et vult Christus, ut in genere omnibus, quibus poenitentia agenda praedicatur, etiam haec promissio evangelii proponatur, Luc. 24, 47; Marc. 16, 15.ⁱⁱⁱ

^{29]} Et hanc vocationem Dei, quae per verbum evangelii nobis offertur, non existimemus esse simulatam et fucatam, sed certo statuamus, Deum nobis per eam vocationem voluntatem suam revelare, quod videlicet in iis, quos ad eum modum vocat, per Verbum efficax esse velit, ut illuminentur, convertantur et salventur. Verbum enim illud, quo vocamur, ministerium Spiritus est, 2 Cor. 3, 8, quod Spiritum Sanctum affert, seu per quod Spiritus Sanctus hominibus confertur, et est virtus Dei ad salutem omni credenti, Rom. 1, 16. Cum igitur Spiritus Sanctus per Verbum efficax esse, nos corroborare et vires subministrare velit, profecto vult Dominus, ut verbum evangelii recipiamus, ei credamus atque pareamus.^{iv}

^{33]} Hanc revelatam Dei voluntatem inquiramus, meditemur, atque, ut eidem pareamus, sedulo elaboremus, quandoquidem Spiritus Sanctus per Verbum (quo nos vocat) gratiam, vires et facultatem largiri vult; arcae autem et occultae praedestinationis divinae abyssum perscrutari ne conemur. In hanc sententiam Christus cuidam curiose

interroganti, an pauci salvarentur, respondit [Luc. 13, 24]: Contendite, ut intretis per angustam portare . Et D. Lutherus inquit (in praef. sup. ep. ad Rom.): Eodem ordine, quem Paulus in epistola ad Romanos observavit, procede. Prima tua cura sit de Christo eiusque evangelio, ut et tua peccata et ipsius gratiam atque clementiam agnoscas. Deinde luctare cum peccato, sicut docet Paulus a primo capite usque ad octavum. Postea ubi (in octavo capite) sub cruce, tentationibus et afflictionibus exercitatus fueris, nonum, decimum et undecimum caput recte te docebunt, quanta in praedestinatione divina consolatio reposita sit.^v

Week Ten Trinity

Symbolum Athanasii contra Arianos scriptum: ^{1]} Quicumque vult salvus esse, ante omnia opus est, ut teneat catholicam fidem. ^{2]} Quam nisi quisque integram inviolatamque servaverit, absque dubio in aeternum peribit. ^{3]} Fides autem catholica haec est, ut unum Deum in Trinitate et Trinitatem in unitate veneremur, ^{4]} Neque confundentes personas, neque substantiam separantes. ^{5]} Alia est enim persona Patris, alia Filii, alia Spiritus Sancti. ^{6]} Sed Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti una est divinitas, aequalis gloria, coaeterna maiestas.^{vi}

^{15]} Ita Deus Pater, Deus Filius, Deus Spiritus Sanctus; ^{16]} Et tamen non tres Dii sunt, sed unus est Deus. ^{17]} Ita Dominus Pater, Dominus Filius, Dominus Spiritus Sanctus; ^{18]} Et tamen non tres Domini, sed unus est Dominus. ^{19]} Quia sicut singulatim unamquamque personam Deum ac Dominum confiteri christiana veritate compellimur, Ita tres Deos, aut tres Dominos dicere catholica religione prohibemur.^{vii}

^{20]} Pater a nullo est factus, nec creatus, nec genitus. ^{21]} Filius a Patre solo est, non factus, nec creatus, sed genitus. ^{22]} Spiritus Sanctus a Patre et Filio, non factus, nec creatus, nec genitus, sed procedens. ^{23]} Unus ergo Pater, non tres Patres; unus Filius, non tres Filii; unus Spiritus Sanctus, non tres Spiritus Sancti. ^{24]} Et in hac Trinitate nihil prius aut posterius, nihil maius aut minus; ^{25]} Sed totae tres personae coaeternae sibi sunt et coaequales. Ita ut per omnia, sicut iam supra dictum est, et Trinitas in unitate et unitas in Trinitate veneranda sit. ^{26]} Qui vult ergo salvus esse, ita de Trinitate sentiat.^{viii}

Chemnitz: Intelligit ergo Ecclesia nomine essentiae non nomen universale, ut philosophi nominant essentiam humanam, sed naturam divinam revera existentem, quae communicabilis est et communis tribus personis, Patri, Filio et Spiritui sancto et est tota in singulis.¹²⁷

Gerhard: Essentia hominum est nomen universale, quod per se revera non existit, sed cogitatione tantum colligitur et intellectu comprehenditur. Essentia vero in divinis non est quiddam imaginarium, ut genus vel species, sed revera existit, quamvis sit communicabilis.¹²⁸

Baier: Intelligitur nomine essentiae, sive οὐσία, ipsa natura divina, qualis in se absolute, quaeque una cum attributis simplicissime una ac singularis.¹²⁹

Gerhard: Vox οὐσία de Deo usurpata significat numero unam et indivisam essentiam

tribus deitatis personis communem, quae non est partialiter in tribus personis, ita ut pars ejus sit in Patre, pars in Filio, pars in Spiritu sancto, sed tota est in Patre, tota in Filio, tota in Spiritu sancto propter infinitatem et immaterialitatem.¹³⁰

Chemnitz: Petrus, Paulus, Joannes sunt tres personae, quibus communis est una natura humana, sed differunt valde multum 1. substantia, 2. tempore, 3. voluntate, 4. potentia, 5. operatione.... In Trinitate vero non ita distinguuntur personae, sicut angelus ab angelo, homo ab homine, neque differunt tempore, voluntate, potentia, operatione, sed in personis Trinitatis est coaeternitas, una voluntas, una potentia, una operatio.¹³¹

Quenstedt: The Trinity is already known from Gn 1:2,3, ubi mentio fit Dei dicentis, verbi, etc. und auf Ps 33:6, ubi David Patrem designat nomine Jehova, quod hoc loco personaliter sumitur et expresse a verbo et spiritu oris ejus distinguitur.¹³²

Gerhard: 1. Non hoc dicimus, quod testimoniorum de trinitate in Vetere et Novo Testamento sit eadem claritas et evidentia, quia clarior huius mysterii revelatio Novo Testamento fuit reservata.—2. Nec hoc volumus, quod in disceptatione contra pertinacem adversarium ab obscurioribus Veteris Testamenti dictis faciendum sit initium. Sed hoc duntaxat asserimus, quod ex Vetere Testamento pro adstruendo trinitatis dogmate quaedam testimonia afferri possint et debeant, cum Deus semper ab initio sese sic patefecerit, ut ecclesia omnibus temporibus Deum ita agnoverit, invocarit et celebrarit—quod in una indivisa essentia sunt tres distinctae personae.¹³³

Hafenreffer: Pluralitas in divinitatis unitate est hypostatica seu personarum, nam essentia quidem divinitatis est una, sed personae sunt plures: adeoque in mysterio divinitatis est quidem aliud et aliud, sed non aliud et aliud. Alia namque persona est Patris, alia Filii, alia Spiritus Sancti, sed non alia et alia, verum una est omnium personarum essentia.¹³⁴

Quenstedt: Persona aliter ab essentia, aliter ab alia persona distinguitur: ab illa non re, sed ratione, cum fundamento in re, ab hac vero re ipsa, omni operatione intellectus humani cessante.¹³⁵

Quenstedt: Vera et realis personarum divinarum distinctio non infert essentiae divinae divisionem aut multiplicationem. Deus enim non dividitur in tres personas, sed tres personae inter se distinctae unicam illam numero essentiam indivisam et infinitam indivisim participant, ita ut quaelibet persona eandem essentiam habeat sine eius multiplicatione aut divisione. In hoc enim mysterio datur aliud atque aliud ὑποστατικῶς, non aliud et aliud οὐσιωδῶς. Atque ita tres illae realiter distinctae personae sunt et manent ὁμοούσιοι.¹³⁶

Gerhard: trinum Deum dicimus, sed triplicem dicere christiana religione prohibemur.¹³⁷

Week Eleven

Trinity

Quenstedt: Haec generatio Filii non fit derivatione aut transfusione, nec actione quae

incipiat aut desinat, sed fit indesinente emanatione, cui simile nihil habetur in rerum natura. Deus Pater enim Filium suum ab aeterno genuit et semper gignit nec umquam desinet gignere. Si enim generatio Filii finem haberet, haberet etiam initium, et sic aeterna non esset. Nec tamen propterea generatio haec dici potest imperfecta aut successiva, actus namque generationis in Patre et Filio consideratur in opere perfectus, in operatione perpetuus.¹³⁸

Hollaz: Intelligitur spiratio non externa, qualis erat insufflatio Christi ad discipulos, sed interna et immanens, cum fiat intra deitatis sinum; non transitoria et evanescens, qualis est hominum spirantium, sed aeterna et permanens, quia Spiritus Sanctus ab aeterno procedit ... ; non spiratio accidentalis sed substantialis.¹³⁹

Hollaz: Spiratio passiva seu processio Spiritus Sancti a Patre et Filio, i.e. aeterna Spiritus Sancti origo, qua ipse intra sinum deitatis a Patre et Filio, unius eiusdemque numero essentiae communicatione, ut commune utriusque spiraculum producit.¹⁴⁰

Hollaz: Dicitur spiratio passiva non physice, quasi inferat potentiam passivam aut imperfectionem, sed grammaticae, quia Spiritus Sanctus non spirare sed spirari dicitur. Neque spiratio activa et passiva sunt duae spirationes, sed est una eademque spiratio, quae ratione principii spirantis et producentis spiratio activa, ratione termini producti passiva vocatur. Ceteroqui purissima est emanatio Spiritus Sancti a Patre et Filio.¹⁴¹

Dogmatic axiom: Quid est nasci, quid processus, me nescire sum professus.¹⁴²

Quenstedt: Actiones divinae ad intra personales sunt, quae ad ipsum Deum ita terminantur, ut tamen pro principio agendi non agnoscant essentiam divinam, quatenus ea omnibus tribus personis communis est, sed prout certis characteribus et proprietatibus hypostaticis est determinata. Unde haec opera ad intra personalia sunt divisa, h.e. non sunt tribus personis divinis communia, sed uni tantum personae vel duabus personis propria.¹⁴³

Opera ad intra sunt divisa. Opera ad extra sunt indivisa aut communia.¹⁴⁴

Gerhard: In operibus ad extra et respectu creaturarum, quando nominatur tantum una persona, vel duae, tota Trinitas intelligitur.¹⁴⁵

Quenstedt: Ex discrimine personarum reali oritur earum ordo, cum in subsistendo, tum in operando. Distinguendum tamen inter ordinem 1. naturae, 2. temporis, 3. dignitatis, 4. originis et relationis. Non datur inter personas divinas ordo naturae, quia sunt ὁμοούσιοι, ejusdem naturae et essentiae; neque temporis, quia sunt ὁμαιώνιοι, coaeterni; neque dignitatis, quia sunt ἰσότιμοι, ejusdem honoris; sed datur inter illas ordo originis et relationis, quia Pater a nullo est, Filius a Patre et Spiritus S. ab utroque.¹⁴⁶

Hollaz: Deus Pater est prima divinitatis persona, nec genita nec procedens, sed ab aeterno gignens Filium, substantialem sui imaginem, et cum Filio ab aeterno spirans Spiritum Sanctum; creans, conservans et gubernans omnia, mittens Filium redemptorem et

Spiritum Sanctum, sanctificatorem generis humani. Filius Dei est secunda divinitatis persona, ab aeterno a Patre genita, eiusdem cum Patre essentiae et maiestatis, quae cum Patre ab aeterno spirat Spiritum Sanctum et in plenitudine temporis humanam naturam in propriam hypostasim assumpsit, ut humanum genus redimeret et salvaret. Spiritus Sanctus est tertia divinitatis persona, eiusdem cum Patre et Filio essentiae, quae ab aeterno procedit a Patre et Filio et ab utroque mittitur ad sanctificandum corda hominum salvandorum.¹⁴⁷

Hafenreffer: Annon tamen similitudinibus quibusdam ceu rudissimis lineamentis haec unitatis pluralitas vel aliquatenus adumbrari potest? Quod adorandae divinitatis mysterium exprimat, nihil in omni rerum universitate reperire licet. Creaturas enim Deus creator immensis graduum intervallis excedit... In quibus similitudinibus tamen omnibus multo maiores sunt dissimilitudines quam similitudines: nihil enim neque in coelo est neque in terra, quod infiniti Dei naturam referre, nulla nec vox nec ratio est, quae mysterium tantum digne explicare possit.¹⁴⁸

Gerhard: Similitudines a.) Illustrant tantum, non probant. b.) Plus in illis dissimilitudinis, quam similitudinis. c.) A posteriori petitae sunt, non a priori; non sunt cognitionis parentes, sed soboles, non adducunt ad cognoscendum sed adducuntur ad cognitum repraesentandum. d.) Sobrie ac caute illis utendum. 3.) Adversario opponi nequeunt, credentem oblectare possunt.¹⁴⁹

Augustine: Magna prorsus inopia humanum laborat eloquium. Dictum est tamen Tres Personae, non ut illud diceretur, sed ne taceretur omnino. Non enim rei ineffabilis eminentia hoc vocabulo explicari valet.¹⁵⁰

Chemnitz: Primum hoc multos offendit, etiam antiquis temporibus, quare ecclesia, loquens de articulo Trinitatis, non contenta fuerit simplici illa proprietate, qua ipse filius Dei, patefaciens doctrinam de Deo, usus est, et quam Spiritus sanctus in Prophetis et Apostolis secutus est, sed peregrinas appellationes ex impiis Ethnicorum scholis in Ecclesiam introduxerit. Nullum enim omnino dubium est, vocabula illa in scholis Philosophorum usitata esse. Et magna invidia praegravabantur orthodoxi Patres ab Haereticis, specioso hoc praetextu, quod scilicet Ecclesia de illa inaccessiblei luce divinitatis non aliter deberet sentire, quam ipsa divinitas prodiens ex arcana Majestatis suae sede se patefecit... Maluisset ergo Ecclesia illa simplicitate sermonis uti, ut sicut credit, ita etiam loqueretur, unum esse Deum, Patrem, Filium et Spiritum sanctum. Sed exorta sunt certamina haereticorum, impugnantium partim unitatem Dei, partim Trinitatem, ita callide tamen, ut cum confiterentur, esse unum Deum, ita intelligebant, quamquam plures sunt Dii, vocari tamen unum Deum, sicut cor credentium vocatur unum, Actor. 4, v. 32... Quia ergo haeretici loquebantur cum Ecclesia, et tamen diversum sentiebant, et per verisimiles locutiones, ut inquit Nazianzenus, venena clanculum spargebant apud imperitos, qui nihil mali suspicabantur, cum audirent istos loqui iisdem verbis, quibus utitur Ecclesia, conati sunt viri Ecclesiastici in Scriptura invenire vocabula, quibus ex insidiis protraherent latitantes haereticos, ne possent ambiguis locutionibus incautos decipere.¹⁵¹

Week Twelve Creation

Catechismus Maior D. Martini Lutheri. Articulus I.:

Credo in Deum Patrem omnipotentem, Creatorem coeli et terrae.

^{10]} Quatenam sit Dei Patris essentia, voluntas et opus, hisce verbis compendiosissime e adumbratum et propositum est. Cum enim decem praecepta docuerint non esse nisi unum Deum habendum et colendum, in quaestionem venire posset, quid Deus esset, quid operis faceret, quibus denique rebus laudandus sit aut depingendus, ut cognoscatur. Hoc iam sequens docet articulus, fidem nihil aliud esse quam responsionem quandam et confessionem Christianorum ad primum praeceptum ordinatam. ^{11]} Velut puer interrogatus a quopiam: quemnam Deum habes, aut quid de illo compertum tenes? respondere possit: Primum quidem hoc Deus meus est, videlicet Pater, qui coelum ac terram condidit; extra hunc unum nullum alium Deum esse credo, praeter hunc enim nemo est, qui sua virtute atque potentia coelum ac terram possit condere. ^{ix}

^{12]} Ceterum pro doctis, et qui aliquam Scripturae cognitionem sibi paraverunt, ii tres articuli aliquanto fusius et locupletius declarari possunt inque tot partes dividi, quot verbis fidei Symbolum contextum est. Verum in praesentia pro novitiis scholasticis maxime cognitu necessaria indicasse sufficiat, nempe hunc articulum, ut diximus, ad rerum creationem pertinere, ut huic verbo innitatur: Creator coeli et terrae. ^{13]} Quid ergo haec sibi verba volunt, aut his tu significari putas: Credo in Deum Patrem omnipotentem, Creatorem etc.? Responsio: Hoc significari puto et credo, me Dei esse creaturam, hoc est, quod ille mihi dederit quotidieque alat sustentetque corpus, animam, vitam, membra corporis, cum parva tum magna, omnes sensus, rationem, rationis usum virtutemque intelligentiae, ac deinceps cibum et potum, amictum, commeatum, uxorem, liberos, familiam, aedes, praedia etc. ^x

^{14]} Adhaec qui omnes creaturas ad vitae meae utilitatem et necessitatem servire mihi sinit, solem, lunam et sidera coelestis, diem et noctem, aerem, ignem, aquam, terram et omnes fructus terrae, quos sua fecunditate producit, volucres, pisces et omnia frumentorum et fructuum genera. ^{15]} Insuper si quae sunt alia rerum corporalium et temporalium bona, ut est aequabilis reipublicae status et administratio, pax, tranquilla securitas. ^{16]} Ita ut ex hoc articulo discamus, nostrum neminem vitam omniaque alia iam enumerata, et quae adhuc enumerari possent, a se habere neque retinere posse, quamlibet pusillum aut leve fuerit. Haec enim omnia nomine *Creatoris* comprehensa sunt. ^{17]} Praeter haec ingenue quoque confitemur Deum Patrem non solum haec omnia, quae habemus, possidemus, coramque oculis intuemur, nobis dedisse, sed quotidie etiam eius tutela nos ab omnibus malis atque periculis custodiri, omnes incommoditates, ruinas atque discrimina a nobis abigente et propulsante. Quae omnia mera humanitate et bonitate sua pellectus nobis immerentibus exhibet, tamquam lenis ac clemens Pater, cui nos curae sumus, ne quid mali aut adversi nobis accidat. ^{18]} Verum ea verbosius persequi ad reliquas duas partes pertinet. ^{xi}

Hollaz: Opus creationis Deo patri in sacris litteris et symbolo apostolico perculiariter tribuitur (a) Propter ordinem operandi; eo quod Pater a se habet, quod agat et creet, Filius Dei et Spiritus S. a Patre. (b) Quia Deus Pater omnipotentiam suam efficacissimo verbo

mandati in opere creationis manifestavit, Gn 1:3. (c) Creatio est opus divinum ad extra primum, adeoque de prima Divinitatis persona per quamdam appropriationem dicitur.— Tres divinitatis Personae non sunt tres causae sociae, non tres auctores creationis, sed una causa, unus auctor creationis, unus creator.—Licet tres distinctae sint personae, una tamen virtute influunt in opus creationis. Si diversa operandi virtute influerent, forent causae sociae.¹⁵²

Hollaz: *Creatio* est actio divina libera, propterea quod Deus hoc universum condidit, non adductus necessitate, prorsus ac si famulitio creaturarum indiguerit, cum sit αὐταρκέστατος, sed libere, ut potuerit creare et non-creare, citius aut serius, hoc vel alio modo condere.¹⁵³

Quenstedt: Materia creationis ex qua respectu rerum primo die creaturarum nulla datur. Quae enim primo die creata sunt, non ex praeeistente sive antea creata materia sed ex nihilo pure negativo facta sunt.—Quando dicitur, opera primi diei esse creata ex nihilo, particula *ex* non designat materiam ex qua, sed excludit. Non enim aliud notatur per τό *ex* nihilo, quam terminus a quo; hoc est, nihilum, ex quo omnia facta dicuntur, non materiae, sed termini, a quo duntaxat rationem habet, et de creationis ordine intelligi debet, et recte particula “*ex*” per “*post*” verti potest, ut Thomas observat, ut sensus sit: post nihilum, velut terminum a quo, aliquid factum est.¹⁵⁴

Calov: Non consistit creatio in emanatione ex essentia Dei, non in generatione nec etiam in motu aut mutatione naturali ... sed in actione externa, qua e nihilo ... virtute infinita res producuntur.¹⁵⁵

Chemnitz: Non disputandum est autem curiosius de discrimine Personarum in opere creationis, sed contenti simus illa revelatione, quod ab aeterno Patre, per Filium, fovente Spiritu Sancto creata sint omnia. Ro 11:36. Sunt autem haec non ad inaequalitatem Personarum trahenda, sicut Ariani blasphemarunt Filium fuisse instrumentum Dei in creatione, sicut faber utitur securi. Nam haec praepositiones (ἐκ, διὰ, εἰς) non naturam dividunt, sed unius inconfusae naturae proprietates exprimunt.¹⁵⁶

Hollaz: Deus mundum hunc aspectabilem non creavit ex essentia sua neque hanc in partes quasi diffudit, ut quaelibet creatura deitatis particula dici possit.¹⁵⁷

Gerhard: Facessant deliria Stoicorum, qui fingeant duo aeterna principia, νοῦν καὶ ὕλην, mentem sive Deum et materiam, quam aeternis temporibus confusum chaos fuisse et certo tempore a mente demum efformatam somniabant.¹⁵⁸

Augustine: Procul dubio non est mundus factus in tempore, sed cum tempore.¹⁵⁹

Calov *Creatio* rerum non ab aeterno facta est, sed in principio illo, quo omne tempus fluere coepit.¹⁶⁰

Quenstedt: Id quod esse non potest, nisi post non-esse, non potest esse ab aeterno; at nulla creatura esse potest, nisi post non-esse creari enim est ex nihilo produci. Ergo.—

rebus a se conditis in esse suo conservandis et ad fines suos deducendis conducunt, disponere et conferre novit; verum etiam actum voluntatis, quo juxta scientiam illam suam vult et statuit creaturas conservare et gubernare.¹⁶⁸

Quenstedt: Licet itaque providentia divina praesupponat πρόγνωσιν seu praescientiam et πρόθεσιν seu decretum providendi ab aeterno factum, ipsa tamen proprie et formaliter consistit in διοικήσει seu actuali rerum creaturarum conservatione et gubernatione.¹⁶⁹

Hoffmann: Et circa πρόγνωσιν quidem notandum est partim, eam Deo tribui solum ἀνθρωποπαθῶς et respectu nostri, qui in tempore versamur, et res secundum prius et posterius mensuramus; Deus vero omnia quasi praesentia videt et intuetur in νῦν perpetuo, stabili et immutabili.¹⁷⁰

Jerome: Praescientia futurorum non immutabile facit, quod Deus futuram novit. Non enim quia Deus futura cognoscit, necesse est nos facere quod ille praescivit; sed quod nos propria voluntate facturi sumus, ille novit futurum.... Aliud est quando dico, praescientiae divinae respectu aliquid esse immutabile aut fieri necessario; aliud vero est quando dico, rem esse immutabilem propter praescientiam Dei, vel quod idem est, praescientiam rebus praescitis afferre necessitatem.... Quo respectu recte dicitur: res praescitas eo modo evenire, quo praescitae sunt, non causaliter respectu praescientiae, quasi haec res praescitas hoc et non alio modo evenire faciat; sed tantum conditionaliter, quatenus Deus non aliter res praescivit, quam prout ex causis suis propriis et quidem libere sunt eventurae. Iam ergo quando res aliqua hoc modo fit, recte dicitur, quod alio modo fieri non potuerit respectu divinae praescientiae; secundum vulgatam regulam: omne quod est quando est, tum esse necesse est.¹⁷¹

Hoffmann: Qualis enim est διοίκησις in tempore, talis etiam est πρόθεσις in aeternitate propter exactissimam utriusque, decreti scilicet et executionis (διοίκησις), harmoniam et conformitatem. Sicuti ergo hominum actiones in tempore Deus ita διοικεί, ut bonas praecipiat, probet, adjuvet, malas vero nec praecipiat, aut probet, sed propter finem bonum, quem ex iis elicere novit, permittat, et sic, dicente Augustino, nihil fit visibiliter et sensibiliter, quod non de sensibili et intelligibili summi imperantis aula aut jubeatur aut permittatur.¹⁷³

Baier: Variant sententiae, quatenus alii non tam actus immanentes mentis et voluntatis divinae quam ipsos actus externos conservandi et gubernandi nomine providentiae significari contendunt; alii quidem actum immanentem eo nomine denotari docent. Credunt autem ad intellectum formaliter, ad voluntatem consequenter pertinere; alii vice versa. Quam tamen controversiam omnem non tam de re ipsa quam de vocibus esse facile cognoscitur.¹⁷⁴

Hoffmann: Accipitur autem hic (sc. πρόθεσις) non specialiter, de proposito Dei de salute nostra, prout sumitur Rom.8:28; Eph.1:11; hoc modo enim consideratur in loco de praedestinatione, sed generaliter, prout ad omnia, quaecumque providentiae subjacent, sese extendit.¹⁷⁵

Cicero: Magna dii curant, parva negligunt.¹⁷⁶

Gerhard: Ipsa illa, quae conservatur ac regitur natura, divinae providentiae testis est. Si naturae discipulus esse volueris, invenies non minus vilissimis et minimis rebus consuli quam nobilissimis; ad finem necessaria conferri omnibus; in certo ac mirabili ordine persistere omnia; ea, quae sine sensu et cogitatione agunt, tamen obtinere suum finem; res inter se pugnantes ita temperari, ut vires invicem frangendo, repugnantia sua mundo prosint.—Sed illa ex naturae libro petita divinae providentiae cognitio languida est et imperfecta, non aliquo naturae ipsius sed mentis nostrae vitio.... Certior autem et perfectior est illa providentiae cognitio, quae ex Scripturae libro petitur.¹⁷⁷

Hollaz: Conservat Deus species et individua. Species conservat essentias rerum ab interitu vindicando et perseverantiam iis impertiendo. Individua conservat in locum intereuntium nova substituendo, ut essentia specierum perseveret.¹⁷⁸

Hoffmann: Uti enim Deus ubique est per essentiam ac omnia permeat, singulisque essentiis rerum creaturarum intime illabitur; ita illapsu vel influxu hoc sustentantur et conservantur in esse suo singula, et ut radiorum esse a sole dependet, ita et creaturarum esse dependet a Dei conservatione per influxum continuum, directum et positivum, quo vel ad momentum subtracto subsistere non possent, et quidem non generalem tantum sed specialem vel potius singularem, quo res omnes et singulas, non genera saltem et species rerum, sed et individua conservat immediate suamet actione ipsas attingendo, et non tantum per virtutem a se impressam vel in effectis relictam.¹⁷⁹

Hollaz: Conservatio divina non est actus mere negativus aut indirectus; neque enim in eo consistit, quod Deus res conditas non velit destruere aut annihilare, sed eas vigori suo relinquere, quoad vigere possunt ac durare ex vi per creationem ipsis indita; sed est actus positivus et directus, quo Deus in genere causae efficientis in esse rei conservandae influxu vero et reali influit, ut in natura, proprietatibus et viribus suis persistent ac permaneant.¹⁸⁰

Week Fourteen

Providence

Quenstedt: Deus res omnes conservat continuatione actionis, qua res primum produxit. Conservatio enim rei proprie nihil est aliud, quam continuata ejus productio, nec differunt, nisi per extrinsecam quandam denominationem.¹⁸¹

Hoffmann: Haec (conservatio) nihil aliud est quam continuata creatio.¹⁸²

Gerhard: Conservatio est existentiae continuatio.... continuus est quasi divinae potentiae omnia conservantis in res existentes omnes influxus, quo vel ad momentum subtracto nec agere, imo nec esse possunt.¹⁸³

Calov: Actio Dei externa, qua ... omnia, quae sunt, sustentat pro voluntatis suae arbitrio, ... ut Deus ubique est per essentiam ac per omnia com meat, singulisque essentiis illabitur

intime, ita illapsu et influxu hoc sustentantur et conservantur.¹⁸⁴

Heraclitus: Universa decurrere fluminis instar.¹⁸⁵

Quenstedt: Non quaeritur hoc loco, an Deus vim operandi causis secundis communicet eamque conservet: hic enim concurrenti modus non plus Deo tribuit, quam quod esse rerum agendique facultatem, quam initio illis dedit, conservet, sed hoc quaeritur, an Deus immediate in actionem et cum actione in effectum, qua talem, causarum secundarum, ad unius cuiusque exigentiam influat.... Cum concursu divino coincidit quoad rem omnipraesentia divina.¹⁸⁶

Quenstedt: De concursu causae primae cum secundis observandum, I. quod Deus non solum vim agendi det causis secundis et eam conservet (in quo solo Durandus, Taurellus, quidam Pontificii et Arminiani omnem Dei concursum collocant), sed quod immediate influat in actionem et effectum creaturae, ita ut idem effectus non a solo Deo, nec a sola creatura, nec partim a Deo, partim a creatura, sed una eademque efficientia totali simul a Deo et creatura producat, a Deo videl. ut causa universali et prima, a creatura, ut particulari et secunda. Unde Deo concursum suum subtrahente, cessat creaturae actio, ut in igne Babylonico apparuit (Dn 3:27). Concerning this he says further: Non est reipsa alia actio influxus Dei, alia operatio creaturae, sed una et indivisibilis actio, utrumque respiciens et ab utroque pendens, a Deo ut causa universali, a creatura, ut particulari. He illustrates with the following comparison: Quemadmodum eadem numero scriptio pendet a manu et calamo, nec pars una a manu et alia a calamo, sed tota a manu et tota a calamo: ita concursus Dei non est prior actione creaturae propria prioritate causalitatis, cum in re sit omnino eadem actio. Adeoque totum effectum producit Deus, sicut et causa secunda, quod fit per actionem Dei exteriorem, quae intime in actione creaturae includitur, imo una eademque est cum illa.¹⁸⁷

1. Concurrit Deus cum causis secundis juxta earum naturam; cum liberis libere, cum necessariis necessarie, cum fortibus fortiter etc. 2. Deus concurrit ad materiale, non ad formale.¹⁸⁸

Hutterus: Contingens definitur esse id, quod cum fit, neque impossibile neque necessarium est, sed habet causam, quae poterat ex natura sua aliter agere, ut est voluntas hominis; vel ut alii definiunt, contingens est, quodque vel hoc vel alio modo se habere, vel quod fieri et non fieri potest, et priusquam fit, impediri potest ne fiat, cum vero fit, causam habet, quae sua natura aliter agere poterat et cuius contradictoria non esset impossibilis.—Proditio Judae respectu providentiae divinae dicitur necessaria, necessitate consequentiae: quia nimirum Deus ab aeterno providit, Judam destinata malitia ac consilio certo proditurum Christum: contingens vero, quatenus voluntatis suae pravis desideriis resistere et Christum prodere non potuisset. Quia nimirum Deus non aliter providit res illas, quam prout ex causis suis eventurae erant: ergo sic etiam eveniunt, prout Deus eas providit.¹⁸⁹

Hollaz: Qui docent concursum praevium, committunt contradictionem in adjecto. Nam si Deus concurrit, non praecurrit, si cooperatur, non praeoperatur. Praemotio est actus

antecedens: Concursus vero non antecedit, sed fit, cum actio ipsa producitur.¹⁹⁰

Deus concurrit ad materiale, non ad formale malae actionis.¹⁹¹

Deus concurrit ad effectum, non ad defectum actionis.¹⁹²

Quenstedt describes this false theory: effectus causarum secundarum proprie a causis secundis non produci, sed a solo Deo ad praesentiam rerum secundarum effici, ipsis nihil agentibus.¹⁹³

Baumgarten: Concursus Dei generalis ad actiones rerum creatarum omnes in eo consistit, ut Deus vires illarum continet.¹⁹⁴

Leidener Synopsis: Sequitur, nullam esse in creaturis libertatem voluntatis, welche nicht waere aus der prima propria causa omnis libertatis.¹⁹⁵

Hottinger: Deus cum humana voluntate non concurrit tantum influxu generali et indifferente, sed speciali et determinante.¹⁹⁶

Calvin: Nec alia ratione, quae futura sunt, praevidet, nisi quia, ut fierent, decrevit.¹⁹⁷

Hollaz: Permissio divina ... est actus negativus, consistens in negatione vel suspensione impedimenti ineluctabilis. Posset quidem Deus obiecto impedimento violento aut impervincibili peccatorem refrenare aut coercere; at sunt numini sanctissimo causae permittendi peccatum iustissimae.¹⁹⁸

Quenstedt: Deus quidem permittit, sed non vult permissum, quod fit non quidem Deo absolute nolente, h.e. retinente ac impediante, attamen non volente. Dei non-impedire non est velle, sed permittere et simul etiam nolle, quatenus serio ei displicent, quae permittit.¹⁹⁹

Gerhard: Non vult Deus peccatum et tamen non impedit, quae est ipsa permissio. Quamvis vero permittat volens, non invitus, tamen permissio et voluntas ad diversa tendunt obiecta: permissio refertur ad peccatum ipsum, voluntas ad finem utilem, quem pro sua sapientia ex illo novit educere.²⁰⁰

Hollaz: Permissio divina non est blanda indulgentia, quasi Deus plane non curet, quando homines scelera committunt; nec est relaxatio legis, quasi peccandi licentiam hominibus permittat; neque est impotentia in Deo vel defectus scientiae, quasi malum velit aut probet; vel defectus potentiae, quasi peccatum cohibere nequeat; neque Deum facit otiosum peccatorum spectatorem.²⁰¹

Quenstedt: Permissio est actus providentiae gubernatricis, quo Deus creaturas racionales ad peccandum sua sponte sese inclinantes per impedimenta, quibus agens finitum resistere nequit, vel quibus non restitutum novit, a malo lege vetito non retrahit, sed iustis de causis in peccata ruere sinit.²⁰²

Quenstedt: Impedit Deus concursum suum subtrahendo, infirmiora roborando, fortiora vero vi divina reprimendo. Impeditio est actus providentiae gubernatricis, quo Deus actiones creaturarum pro arbitrio suo constringit, ne effectum dent, quod vel naturali vel libera agendi vi alias efficerent.²⁰³

Quenstedt: Decevit Deus non-impedire, sed permittere, ut fierent.... non vero decevit, ut facerent. Distinguendum inter praeparationem et impulsus impiorum, et directionem pessimi criminis ad salutarem finem. Non illa, sed haec Deo tribuenda. Directio est actus providentiae gubernatricis, quo Deus creaturarum actiones bonas ita moderatur, ut tendant et ferantur in objectum a Deo intentum, actiones vero malas ad certum finem a se praestitutum, sed a peccantibus non spectatum et saepe ipsorum intentioni contrarium dirigit.²⁰⁴

Quenstedt: Determinatio est actus providentiae gubernatricis, quo Deus creaturarum viribus, actionibus et passionibus certos terminos, intra quos se contineant, tum ratione temporis, tum ratione magnitudinis et gradus constituit.²⁰⁵

Week Fifteen Family

Readings from Schmid on Marriage and Divorce

**The Final Test, Part One:
Consensus facit matrimoniam.**

Family Week Sixteen

**The Final Test, Part Two:
Quenstedt on the Creation
of Man and Woman**

Translation endnotes

Week One

¹ In an absolute sense the ultimate aim of theology is the glory of God. In a relative sense the ultimate aim is the salvation of man. The intermediate aim is both internal, namely, to lead men to faith and salvation, and external, namely, saving faith.

² Quenstedt: Finally, the term theology is used either οὐσιωδῶς, essentially, absolutely and with respect to aptitude for knowledge which is found in the mind and is inherent in the soul of man or in so far as it is an aptitude of the soul; συμβεβηκότως, accidentally, relatively, systematically, in so far as it is a doctrine or discipline which is taught and learned or contained in books. The former use of the word is primary; the latter is secondary. For theology is first of all or principally called a theological aptitude. But secondly, and in a less important way, it is a doctrine or a discussion, or even a book or system which presents theology.

³ Calov: The remote genus (the broadest classification) of theology is aptitude (habitus) (He 5:14). The nearer genus (narrower classification) is practical aptitude (habitus practicus) (Jn 5:34; Ro 15:4; 2 Tm 3:15), because the aim of the theologian and theology is not bare knowledge but an activity, namely, leading men to salvation. Therefore, it is not a theoretical aptitude consisting in pure thought. Nor is it both theoretical and practical at the same time, which is an oxymoron, since it is impossible that differences which are opposed to one another in a contradictory way, or at least necessarily involve a contradiction, should both be true in one and the same species. Whatever is treated in theology is presented there for no other reason than that it should be directed toward activity, nor is anything divinely revealed with the intention that it should finally consist only in knowledge but that it might be directed toward activity, namely, the blessed enjoyment of God. That theology is a practical aptitude is proved by the duty and function of theologians (Is 61:1,2; Lk 1:16,17; Ac 26:17,18), by the practical aim of theology (Jn 20:31; 2 Tm 3:15,16), and by the means. Any discipline which supplies the practical means by which man ought to be led to eternal salvation and which occupies itself wholly with this that those means be acquired, is purely practical.

⁷ Augustine: You made us, O Lord, for yourself and our heart is restless until it rests in you.

Week Two

ⁱ 1] We believe, teach, and confess that the sole rule and standard according to which all dogmas together with [all] teachers should be estimated and judged are the prophetic and apostolic Scriptures of the Old and of the New Testament alone, as it is written Ps. 119, 105 : Thy Word is a lamp unto my feet and a light unto my path . And St. Paul: Though an angel from heaven preach any other gospel unto you , let him be accursed , Gal. 1, 8 2] Other writings, however, of ancient or modern teachers, whatever name they bear, must not be regarded as equal to the Holy Scriptures, but all of them together be subjected to

them, and should not be received otherwise or further than as witnesses, [which are to show] in what manner after the time of the apostles, and at what places, this [pure] doctrine of the prophets and apostles was preserved.

7] In this way the distinction between the Holy Scriptures of the Old and of the New Testament and all other writings is preserved, and the Holy Scriptures alone remain the only judge, rule, and standard, according to which, as the only test-stone, all dogmas shall and must be discerned and judged, as to whether they are good or evil, right or wrong.

8] But the other symbols and writings cited are not judges, as are the Holy Scriptures, but only a testimony and declaration of the faith, as to how at any time the Holy Scriptures have been understood and explained in the articles in controversy in the Church of God by those then living, and how the opposite dogma was rejected and condemned [by what arguments the dogmas conflicting with the Holy Scripture were rejected and condemned].

¹⁰ Augustine: In these matters, which are openly stated in the Scriptures, are found all things necessary for faith and life, namely, hope and love. If anyone says anything else concerning Christ, or his church, or anything else which has to do with our faith and life, I do not say, “if we” but what Paul adds (Ga 1:8–9), “if an angel from heaven should preach a gospel other than the one you received in the Old and New Testament Scriptures, let him be eternally condemned.” Let our writings be set aside and the Book of God come to the center of the stage.

¹¹ Augustine: In the church not, “I say this, you say this, he says this,” counts; but, “Thus says the Lord.”

¹² Athanasius: The holy and divinely inspired Scriptures are sufficient for all instruction in the truth.

¹⁴ Boniface VIII; *Unam Sanctam*: Moreover, we declare, state, define and pronounce that for every human being subjection to the Roman pontiff is by all means necessary for salvation.

¹⁵ Vat I, Sess. IV, 4: We teach and define this to be a divinely revealed doctrine: When the Roman pontiff speaks *ex cathedra* (this is, when functioning in his office as pastor and teacher of all Christians by his supreme apostolic authority, he defines a doctrine concerning faith and morals which is to be held by the whole church) through the divine assistance promised to him in the blessed Peter, he possesses that infallibility with which the divine Redeemer wanted his church to be endowed in defining a doctrine concerning faith and morals (cf Mt 16:19; 18:18; Jn 20:23).

¹⁶ Trid, Sess. IV: The Synod accepts and venerates all the books both of the Old and New Testament ... and no less with equal feelings of piety and reverence the traditions, both those that pertain to faith and life, as either handed down from Christ by word of mouth or dictated by the Holy Ghost and preserved by continuous succession in the Catholic Church.

¹⁷ Walch: What must be held concerning a subscription with restriction.... Furthermore,

from this it must be evident that a formula of this kind, if it is admitted, does not hinder anyone from being able to subscribe to the Koran or the Racovian Catechism. 1) A subscription with restriction (quatenus) clearly opposes the very nature of this oath. Whoever takes an oath with restriction really offers no binding oath; in so far as the symbolical books are concerned he promises nothing. 2) A subscription with restriction opposes the purpose of the oath both on the part of the magistrate who demands it as well as the one who is to be obligated by its binding force. Therefore, whoever takes a conditional oath grants himself a license to desert without fear, as he pleases, the doctrine presented in the Symbols.

Week Three

²² Quenstedt: The natural knowledge of God is twofold; the one is ἐμφυτος or impressed upon the nature and minds of men in their very origin, innate and implanted, by which man knows God from certain principles born within him through certain fragments and remnants of the divine image, as it were, without any research or operation of the mind; and the other is called ἐπίκτητος or acquired, because it is acquired from inborn principles of nature through a process of reasoning and careful contemplation of created things.

²³ Calov: The natural knowledge of God is partly inborn, partly acquired. The former is that by which man knows God naturally by reason of the remnants of the aptitude for wisdom implanted in man's mind when he was created. The latter is that by which from a consideration of creation and the universal government of the world by means of logical reasoning he comes to the conclusion that God is the creator, preserver, and ruler of creation.

²⁴ Chemnitz: Accurately speaking, (the natural knowledge of God) is either nothing, or imperfect, or weak. It is nothing, because the whole of philosophy knows nothing about the free promise of the forgiveness of sins.... It is imperfect, because the Gentiles know only bits and pieces of the law, but of the interior acts of worship required by the first table (of the law) reason knows and believes nothing that is certain.... It is weak, because even though the fact that God exists and that he demands obedience in accord with the distinction between what is morally good and evil is impressed on the minds of men, nevertheless agreement is not only weak but is often driven out by horrendous doubts.

²⁵ Quenstedt: For the apostle indicates what, on account of the abuse and neglect of men, incidentally follows from this knowledge, namely, that they are without excuse; and he wishes to convict all Gentiles because they did not glorify God as God, although the knowledge of God (i.e. the fact that he exists) was manifest in them.... For although that natural knowledge is not sufficient for a perfect knowledge of God, nor by itself efficacious for conversion, it is, nevertheless, sufficient to convict men of impiety, namely, that they did not even do that which that knowledge dictated, but rather abused it.

²⁶ Hollaz: There can be atheists in theory only, not by nature, but by a just withdrawal of God and a blinding by the devil, not through a total eradication of the light of nature in so far as they have it, but through suffocation of it in so far as the use and exercise of it are concerned; not through the whole length of one's life and permanently, but only through a certain passing seizure for a certain length of time. For the law of nature does not permit the fixed and firm opinion that there is no God to inhere in anyone. For although the mind of an ungodly man is drugged as it were in a stupor so that he does not think about God, nevertheless there can be no one in whom conscience does not finally assert itself and at least at the time of death accuse him of having neglected God.

²⁸ Clement of Alexandria: Many are the ways to salvation.

²⁹ Maldonatus: Since the natural law has been preserved, as all confess, the Gentiles were able to be saved, and apart from the written law.

³⁰ Bellarmine: Add the fact that the fathers teach that the Gentiles, although they commonly worshiped a number of gods, nevertheless were able by nature to know the one God, just as the philosophers, in fact, recognized the one God and from that point of view were, so to speak, Christians naturally.

³² Baier: Indeed, it could appear that among Christians it ought to be assumed rather than proved (that there is a God). Nevertheless, because we must earnestly contend not only with atheists but also at times with the doubts of our own minds on account of the corruption of our nature, those things which prove the existence of God ought not be neglected.

³³ Gerhard: It could seem to someone that that question is an idle one in the church since it is known and admitted by all that there is a God, nor is any nation so barbarous that it denies that there is a God and that he is to be worshiped, although it does not know how he is to be worshiped... But nevertheless one must maintain or prove the fact that there is a God 1) to refute those who deny that there is a God ... 2) to strengthen our faith ... But this faith must be drawn from the Word of God and strengthened by meditation on it. In grave and serious temptations, Chemnitz says, we are all either Epicureans or Stoics. Therefore the heart must be strengthened by a consideration of the things that are said (by philosophers) which testify that there is a God and that he carefully administers human affairs. 3) To perfect the natural knowledge (of God).

ⁱⁱ Apology IV 22-28: Now, we think concerning the righteousness of reason thus, namely, that God requires it, and that, because of God's commandment, the honorable works which the Decalog commands must necessarily be performed, according to the passage Gal. 3, 24 : The Law was our schoolmaster ; likewise 1 Tim. 1, 9 : The Law is made for the ungodly . For God wishes those who are carnal to be restrained by civil discipline, and to maintain this, He has given laws, letters, doctrine, magistrates, penalties. 23] And this righteousness reason, by its own strength, can, to a certain extent, work, although it is often overcome by natural weakness, and by the devil impelling it to

24] manifest crimes. Now, although we cheerfully assign this righteousness of reason the praises that are due it (for this corrupt nature has no greater good, and Aristotle says aright: Neither the evening star nor the morning star is more beautiful than righteousness, and God also honors it with bodily rewards), yet it ought not to be praised with reproach to Christ. 25] For it is false that we merit the remission of sins by our works. 26] False also is this, that men are accounted righteous before God because of the righteousness of reason. 27] False also is this that reason, by its own strength, is able to love God above all things, and to fulfil God's Law, namely, truly to fear God, to be truly confident that God hears prayer, to be willing to obey God in death and other dispensations of God, not to covet what belongs to others, etc.; although reason can work civil works. 28] False also and dishonoring Christ is this, that men do not sin who, without grace, do the commandments of God.

Week Four

³⁵ Gerhard: God is Being itself who exists unlimited in every way. God is a pure and most simple essence. In God to be and to will and to know is one and the same thing.

³⁶ Calov: God is distinguished from other beings not simply through being but through his being actually in the highest sense.

³⁷ Quenstedt: God's existence has its source in his very self, not in a positive sense, through a positive influence, as if he brought himself out of non-existence into existence, but in a negative sense, through the negation of an influence from some one else, because namely, he was not produced by some other entity.

³⁹ Hollaz: The essence and perfections of God have no limits.

⁴⁰ Quenstedt: God is infinite not by reason of quantitative extension, since he is independent of all quantitateness, but by reason of (his) essence and perfection, Ps 145:3. Of his greatness there is no end.

⁴¹ Gerhard: By infinity is meant that God can be limited in respect neither to time, nor to place, nor to anything else but that he by his own nature and essence, actually, without any qualification, of himself and absolutely is infinite.

⁴² Gerhard: God, however, is one in the highest sense. For, in order that something be one in the highest degree, it must be a being in the highest degree and indivisible in the highest degree. God, however, is Being itself, who exists unlimited in all ways. Also, neither actually nor potentially can he be divided. Therefore God is one in the highest sense and degree.

⁴³ Quenstedt: The unity of God is (that attribute) according to which he is not only undivided in essence but simply and absolutely indivisible and incapable of sharing (what he is) by any multiplication of himself.... This excludes completely any division or

sharing of the divine essence with more individuals of the same type.

⁴⁴ Gerhard: The divine essence is most simple without any composition, admixture, and division, and therefore without any accidents (non-essential attributes).

⁴⁵ Calov: From the unity of God follows the simplicity of God, according to which God is devoid of all real composition.

⁴⁶ Scotus Erigena: 1. An uncreated creating being (which is God); 2. A created creating being (which are the productive ideas in god); 3. A noncreating created being (which is matter as such); 4. A being neither created nor creating (which is God as the final aim of the whole process).

⁴⁷ Servetus: In a stone God is a stone, in the trunk of a tree he is a tree trunk, and so on in other things.

⁴⁸ Quenstedt: The divine attributes do not denote anything superadded to the divine essence, but are only inadequate concepts of an infinitely perfect essence. The divine essence is like an incomprehensible Ocean of all the infinite attributes which the human intellect is not able to exhaust in a single and simple concept, and therefore by means of various concepts, sip by sip as it were, it draws something out of that infinity.

⁴⁹ Augustine: (God is) good without quality, great without quantity, the Creator who needs nothing, present without any local position, everywhere in his totality without being anywhere...; God is invisible essence beyond the understanding of every creature ... containing all creation within himself like a mathematical point; God is a creating essence, ruling without labor, holding all things together without being burdened.

⁵¹ Occam: The whole distinction is only in the terms.

⁵² Quenstedt: If the attributes differ from one another only in the mind, those words wise, just, merciful, when spoken about God, will be synonyms, just as among us sword and saber are synonyms. But this is absurd. Sword and saber are distinguished by an active thinking process, the divine attributes by a receptive thinking process, which has a basis in fact.

⁵³ Hollaz: The divine attributes are distinguished from the divine essence and from one another not (only) in name, nor in reality, but formally, according to our way of thinking (about them), not without a definite basis for (this) distinction.

⁵⁴ Quenstedt: The divine attributes are the divine essence itself represented to us by means of several inadequate concepts. Thus the infinity of God is the divine essence itself apprehended as lacking all boundaries and limitations. Omnipotence is the divine essence itself (apprehended) as having no obstacles when he does something. Ibid.: One must distinguish between an objective concept, which is the conceived object itself, and a formal concept, which is a quality produced by our mind, representing the thing known

by means of an idea or a picture impressed (on the mind). Ibid.: The essential divine attributes are distinguished, neither from the divine essence nor from one another in reality or because of their nature, as things clearly different or as two or more parts of one and the same thing, or in any other way, but only in our thinking.

⁵⁵ Gerhard: The divine attributes considered in and by themselves are really and most simply one with the divine essence.

⁵⁹ Quenstedt: And so immensity differs from omnipresence. The former is an absolute attribute, the latter a relative one ... since it implies not only a nearness of the divine essence, or a presence of God with his creatures, but also a certain activity or an active control. The former is eternal, the latter is not at all (eternal), but it began with the creatures(?).

⁶⁰ Quenstedt: There are two classes of attributes: some describe the divine essence absolutely and in itself without reference to any activity, and they are called immanent, ἀνεργητα, or quiescent, which, namely, are not directed toward some actions, such as immensity, eternity, spirituality, etc. Others describe the divine essence relatively, with respect to an activity, and they are called ἐνεργητικά or active and extending themselves to the outside (of the divine essence), or those which are recognized to be directed toward definite activities, as are power, knowledge, righteousness, mercy.

Week Five

⁶¹ Quenstedt: Immutability is the perpetual identity of the divine essence and of all its attributes, negating altogether all change, both physical and moral.

⁶² Baier: Immutability consists in this that God is subject to no mutation, neither according to his essence (by reason of which God is immortal and incorruptible), nor according to his properties, nor according to his position, nor according to his will or purpose.

⁶³ Gerhard: For he changes his actions but his will itself remains unchanged.

⁶⁴ Baier: God's eternity, absolutely so called (for it is not taken here in the sense of a very long time), signifies the permanent existence or duration of God without beginning and end and without all progression and change.

⁶⁵ Quenstedt: That the present, or the “now” is not, properly speaking, time, but the beginning of the future and the end of the past, with all of which eternity coexists ... a perpetual now, and that fixed, not in flux.

⁶⁶ Gerhard: Since God is the highest good, therefore he loves himself as the highest good. In man the love of oneself is wicked and damnable because man is not the highest good, but he ought to seek the highest good in God and to cling to him alone. God, however,

loves himself, yet not in so far as he is himself but in as much as he is the highest good. For if there were any other greater and more excellent good, then he would love that, not himself, as for instance “Theologia Germanica” treats of this matter at length.

⁶⁷ Gerhard: In the deity the Father loves the Son as his own substantial image (Mt 3:17; 17:5; Jn 3:35; 5:20; 17:24). The Son loves the Father since he was born of his heart from eternity (Jn 14:31). The Holy Ghost, who proceeds from both, is the essential love of the Father and of the Son.

⁶⁸ Calov: The goodness of God is that (attribute) according to which God is essentially good, yes, indeed (he is) the highest good.

⁶⁹ Gerhard: Because nothing is lacking to him, because he stands in need of nothing else outside of himself, because he is in want neither of counsel, nor of aid, nor of wisdom, nor of power in acting, nor is he dependent on someone else either in respect to his existence or to his activity.

⁷⁰ Gerhard: God is not only good in himself but he also, radiates and communicates his goodness outside himself which, in view of this communication, is called benevolence.

⁷¹ Cotta: When the goodness of God is under discussion, his essential and metaphysical goodness ought to be distinguished from his moral goodness, as it is called. By God's essential goodness is meant his very perfection in so far as, namely, in God one may find all those things which belong to a most perfect Being, Lk 18:19. But by moral goodness the zeal or inclination of the supreme Godhead to confer any and all good things on his creatures is denoted. And this goodness which takes the misery of creatures into consideration we are accustomed otherwise to call the mercy of God.

⁷² Calov: To that extent Calov says quite correctly concerning the goodness according to which God is essentially good, yes, indeed, the highest good, that it is closely related to holiness, according to which he is essentially holy, yes, he is holiness itself.

⁷³ Calov: A consequence of the divine perfection is majesty, because he is so perfect that God truly is great (Dt 7:21; Nu 24:16; Ps 7:18 (17); 18:14 (13); Ac 7:32; Mt 6:13).

⁷⁴ Calov: Another consequence is blessedness by which he is most blessed, nay rather blessedness itself. Ps 73:25; 1 Tm 1:11; cf. 6:15.

⁷⁵ Gerhard: When, therefore, God is called blessed, it means 1) that he abounds in all good things; 2) that he is free from all evil things; 3) that he is immutably blessed; 4) that essentially and by his own nature he is blessed, yes is blessedness itself (if blessedness were an accident, it could, of course, be lost); 5) that by himself and through himself he is blessed; moreover, he does not have blessedness as something given him by someone else; 6) that God through his intellect fully recognizes and through his will loves his own perfection and blessedness and quietly and peacefully finds pleasure in it; from this pleasure arises joy, by which God delights in himself as the highest good above all his

good works, beyond which none can be called or considered good; 7) that he is self-sufficient, having received no outward good, and lacking nothing good.

^a Psalm 90:1-5 (NASB) LORD, Thou hast been our dwelling place in all generations. 2 Before the mountains were born, Or Thou didst give birth to the earth and the world, Even from everlasting to everlasting, Thou art God.3 Thou dost turn man back into dust, And dost say, "Return, O children of men."4 For a thousand years in Thy sight Are like yesterday when it passes by, 5 Thou hast swept them away like a flood, they fall asleep; In the morning they are like grass which sprouts anew.

: וְרַמְתֶּם שָׁנָה יְהִיוּ בְּבִקְרָךְ כְּחֶצְיֵיר יִחְלֶף⁵

Week Six

⁷⁶ Quenstedt: And so immensity differs from omnipresence. The former is an absolute attribute, the latter a relative one ... since it implies not only a nearness of the divine essence, or a presence with his creatures, but also a certain activity or an active control. The former is eternal, the latter is not, but it began with the creatures (?).

⁷⁷ Decisio Saxonica: Two things are required for a full definition of the presence of God: First, the being there of the infinite and immeasurable God; secondly, the activity of God who is present.

⁷⁸ Gerhard: It is an illocal presence, which cannot be divided into parts, incomprehensible to our reason, efficacious and operative, which contains in itself all things like the tiniest point.

⁷⁹ Gerhard: Because God is everywhere present not by reason of a multiplication of his essence, for he is something wholly whole, an entity of the highest simplicity, and hence wherever he is, he is in his entirety; neither through a division of his essence ... nor through an extension ... nor by an intermingling.

⁸⁰ Cicero: An open and simple mind, joined to nothing by which it is able to perceive, seems to escape the power and conception of our intellect.

⁸¹ Tertullian: Everything that is, is a corporeal being of its own kind: nothing is incorporeal except that which does not exist.... Who will deny that God is a corporeal being, although God is a spirit? For a spirit is a corporeal being of its own kind in its own likeness.

⁸² Servetus: In a stone God truly and properly is a stone, in the trunk of a tree he is a tree trunk, and similarly in other things.

⁸³ Carpov: It cannot happen that God in his entirety is present with any and every being.

⁸⁴ Vorstius: Nowhere do we read a written statement that God is an essence simply

immeasurable and actually present in its entirety in all places; on the contrary, not a few passages occur here and there which seem to have the contrary sense. From this it is already evident that the immensity or ubiquity of the divine essence can not be conclusively proved from the Scriptures.... It is, to be sure, true that God works all in all; nevertheless, it does not follow that God is in an immediate way there present with his essence wherever he works, since he can work through secondary causes, whether physical or supernatural, just as any king through his ministers. Essentially he resides in that highest of heavens as on a throne or in a palace, but in such a way that with his power he is active also on earth according to his operative might. It seems to be a strange paradox that God is so lacking in quantity that the whole God should be essentially present in any and every thing no matter how small. Clearly, as far as place and local presence are concerned there seems to be no doubt at all that they can be truly and properly ascribed to God.

⁸⁵ Gerhard: This immensity and essential omnipresence of God is to be understood in this way: That God is present in all things, not only with his power and efficacy, nor only by his sight and knowledge, but also with his whole and individual essence, for he is immeasurable and infinite not only in his power and knowledge but also in his essence.

⁸⁶ Calov: The knowledge of God must be considered to be truly immeasurable and infinite. By virtue of it God from eternity with one act of intuition knows all things which from our point of view are present, past or future. The same: The omniscience of God is that by which God knows all things which have been, are and will be, as well as those which can be and can not be. As far as the way of knowing is concerned, God sees and knows all things with an infinite and immutable knowledge, not only in time, but from eternity; not little by little or successively, but with one simple and timeless act of knowing.

⁸⁷ Calov: The natural knowledge of God is that by which he knows himself and all possibilities.

⁸⁸ Augustine: What is foreknowledge except a knowledge of future events? What, however, is future in the sight of God, who transcends all concepts of time? For if he has the events themselves in the scope of his knowledge, they are not future as far as he is concerned but present; and by this very fact it can no longer be called foreknowledge but only knowledge.

⁸⁹ Gerhard: The fact that foreknowledge is ascribed to God occurs with respect to our point of view; for in his sight all those things are present which for us are still future.

⁹⁰ Osiander: Just as in God knowledge after the fact has no place, although he knows what happened in the past, so, accurately speaking, foreknowledge cannot be attributed to God under a knowledge of things that are (still) future in time.

⁹¹ Socinus: God knows all things which by their very nature are knowable.... No rational proof, no testimony from Scripture can be brought from which the conclusion is clearly

drawn that before they happen God knows the evils that are dependent on the decisions of men before they happen.

⁹³ Calvin: God foresees the things which are future for no other reason than that he has decreed that they should happen.

⁹⁴ Gerhard: We must distinguish between a *necessitas consequentis* (necessity of the consequent) (which is also called absolute, preceding, simple necessity), which arises out of a necessary connection between cause and effect and an intrinsic connection of terms, and a *necessitas consequentiae* (necessity of the consequence) (which is called hypothetical, following, concomitant, conditional, suppositional), which arises from an act of existence from the very position of the effect, because everything that is from the very fact that it is must necessarily be. According to this latter kind of necessity with respect to divine foreknowledge those things are necessary which take place from causes that act contingently and freely, and this necessity does not take away freedom but rather presupposes it.

⁹⁵ Augustine: Just as you by your memory do not compel those things to have been done which happened in the past, so God by his foreknowledge does not compel those things to be done which are future.

⁹⁶ Augustine: And so (God), who foreknew the causes of all things, could certainly among those causes not have been ignorant of our decisions also, which he foreknew to be the causes of our actions.... How then does a succession of causes, which is certain in the sight of God who has foreknowledge, have this result that nothing happens in our will [i.e., that nothing is dependent on our decisions], although our decisions have an important place in the very order of causes?

Week Seven

⁹⁷ Quenstedt: The love of God is that whereby he on his part pleasantly joins himself with a lovable object [i.e., one that has been made lovable by God's grace].

⁹⁹ Quenstedt: With the love of pleasure God loves all created things, or rather his own goodness which he has shared with them; with the love of benevolence he loves men in particular, for whose sake he sent his Son into the flesh and delivered him into death—in one word it is termed philanthropy; with the love of friendship, however, he attends upon believers and those who have been received into his grace.

¹⁰⁰ Tertullian: Goodness, unless it is governed by justice in order that it may be just, will not be goodness, if it is unjust. For nothing which is unjust is good; everything which is just, however, is good.

¹⁰¹ Quenstedt: The holiness of God is the highest purity in God, a purity free from every spot and blemish whatsoever; demanding from his creatures the cleanness and purity

which they owe; or (it is that purity) by which God is pure, clean and holy in the highest degree, and (is) the author of all purity and holiness in his creatures.

¹⁰² Buddeus: When God is thought of as loving himself with a most pure love so that at the same time he is considered as removed, isolated, separated from all imperfection, that love is called holiness.

¹⁰³ Baier: God, who does not have the law as something he has received from a higher being, is a law unto himself.

¹⁰⁴ Baier: We call it holiness, and it implies the rectitude of the divine will by which he wills all things which are right and good in conformity with his own eternal law.

¹⁰⁵ Calov: The righteousness of God is that by which the righteous God is a rewarder of the good and a punisher of the evil.

¹⁰⁶ Quenstedt: The righteousness of God is the highest and immutable rectitude of the divine will, demanding from the rational creature what is right and just.

¹⁰⁷ Gerhard: Toward his creatures he is just, first of all, dispositively (i.e., in the way he governs and controls all things), in so far as he arranges all his actions, all his *opera ad extra* (i.e., his activities outside the Godhead, his actions toward his creatures) according to the norm of fairness and justice and is the most just governor and ruler of the whole universe; and (he is just) secondly, distributively (i.e., in the way he distributes things to his creatures), in so far as he repays each creature according to his deeds.

¹⁰⁸ Gerhard: Although both from the naturally implanted distinction between what is just and what is unjust as well as from the punishments accompanying the more serious offenses human reason recognizes in some measure that God is just, which is attested by the statements of the Gentiles concerning the righteousness of God; nevertheless that recognition is imperfect and weak.

^b Romans 3:20-28 (NASB95) 20 Because by the works of the Law no flesh will be justified in His sight ; for through the Law *comes* the knowledge of sin . 21 But now apart from the Law *the* righteousness of God has been manifested , being witnessed by the Law and the Prophets , 22 even *the* righteousness of God through faith in Jesus Christ for all those who believe ; for there is no distinction ; 23 for all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God , 24 being justified as a gift by His grace through the redemption which is in Christ Jesus ; 25 whom God displayed publicly as a propitiation in His blood through faith . *This was* to demonstrate His righteousness , because in the forbearance of God He passed over the sins previously committed ; 26 for the demonstration , *I say*, of His righteousness at the present time , so that He would be just and the justifier of the one who has faith in Jesus. 27 Where then is boasting ? It is excluded . By what kind of law ? Of works ? No , but by a law of faith. 28 For we maintain that a man is justified by faith apart from works of the Law.

^c Romans 5:1-5 (KJV) ¹ Therefore being justified by faith, we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ : ² By whom also we have access by faith into this grace wherein we stand, and rejoice in hope of the glory of God . ³ And not only *so*, but we glory in tribulations also: knowing that tribulation worketh patience ; ⁴ And patience, experience; and experience, hope: ⁵ And hope maketh not ashamed; because the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost which is given unto us

Week Eight

¹⁰⁹ Brochmand: When I attribute omnipotence to God, I am ascribing so great a power to him that he is able to do by far more than any creature can comprehend, to such a degree that whatever he wishes to do he is able to do without labor and effort even though all creatures were to oppose him.

¹¹⁰ Gerhard: God's power is infinite 1) in itself and by itself or by its very nature, just as God himself (is infinite), whose essential characteristic it is that he is called infinite; 2) with reference to its objects, which not only have already been produced in great variety and countless numbers but also could be made even infinitely different by him, if that should please his wisdom; 3) by reason of his way of doing things, because God never does anything so intensively and effectively that he could not do it in a more intensive and effective way.

¹¹¹ Pliny: (Gerhard says that Pliny) denies that God is omnipotent because of the fact that he cannot die or lie or make undone what has been done.

¹¹² Hollaz: (Omnipotence is) a divine attribute by which God is able to do everything which can be done and which does not imply any imperfection in God.

¹¹³ Scherzer: (Those arguments) are sophistries by which the definition of a thing is annulled.—For if God would lie, would die, would sin, he would not be God (since God in his essence is by definition truth, life, holiness); if a creature would have infinite perfection, it would not be a creature; if the past would not have passed, it would not be the past; if tomorrow would exist today, it would not be today.

¹¹⁴ Gerhard: From the simplicity of the divine essence it is manifest that in reality power is not distinguished from will; but the question is whether it may be distinguished logically. Durandus and others affirm (this)... But it is more correctly maintained that not even logically is power distinguished from will in God, 1) because Holy Scripture sets the will of God before us as the cause of all things (Ps 115:3; 148:5; Is 46:10); 2) it is in the nature of an imperfection that in a creature endowed with intellect its power to execute its decisions is distinguished from its will, but all imperfection must be removed from God.

¹¹⁵ Abelard: God can only do that which he foreknew and decreed from eternity he would at some time do. But only those things which he at some time does did he foreknow and

decree that he would do.

^d Psalm 139 (NRSV) To the leader. Of David. A Psalm.

¹ O LORD, you have searched me and known me. ² You know when I sit down and when I rise up; you discern my thoughts from far away. ³ You search out my path and my lying down, and are acquainted with all my ways. ⁴ Even before a word is on my tongue, O LORD, you know it completely. ⁵ You hem me in, behind and before, and lay your hand upon me. ⁶ Such knowledge is too wonderful for me; it is so high that I cannot attain it. ¹³ For it was you who formed my inward parts; you knit me together in my mother's womb. ¹⁴ I praise you, for I am fearfully and wonderfully made. Wonderful are your works; that I know very well. ¹⁵ My frame was not hidden from you, when I was being made in secret, intricately woven in the depths of the earth. ¹⁶ Your eyes beheld my unformed substance. In your book were written all the days that were formed for me, when none of them as yet existed. ¹⁷ How weighty to me are your thoughts, O God! How vast is the sum of them! ¹⁸ I try to count them—they are more than the sand; I come to the end^a—I am still with you. ²³ Search me, O God, and know my heart; test me and know my thoughts. ²⁴ See if there is any wicked^c way in me, and lead me in the way everlasting.

Week Nine

¹¹⁷ Calov: The principal attribute of (God's) will is the freedom with which God wills all things outside himself, not from any necessity of (his) nature (not because his nature requires it), but freely, so that he is able also not to will the same things.

¹¹⁸ Gerhard: God is an essence acting most freely. Just as intellect is attributed to God, so also will, which is the ability to act freely and (which is) the governing principle of actions.

¹¹⁹ Doederlein: Freedom is the fact that God is compelled by nothing except the force of reason and is not hindered by impediments when he wishes to desire and accomplish the things that are right and good.

¹²⁰ Gerhard: Some things God wills absolutely, others conditionally. Those things which God wills absolutely, necessarily occur, but those which he wills conditionally do not take place unless the condition is fulfilled. God's will, therefore, does not preclude in man the freedom of choice in external matters, because it does not exclude but includes the subsidiary causes, among which is the freedom of choice, nor does it predetermine the human will in any one direction by a certain physical necessity, but it allows it that freedom which is naturally implanted in it, nor does it bring a certain antecedent and a priori necessity to bear on its choice of action, but by a general cooperation toward producing the result it grants and preserves the power to act.

¹²¹ Gerhard: God wills some things from the necessity of his nature (because his nature requires it), others (he wills) freely. From the necessity of his nature he wills those things which he wills concerning himself, influenced by nothing outside or inside himself; in

this way he wills himself, his own goodness and glory. He wills freely those things which he wills concerning (his) creatures according to the good pleasure of his will. These he was able both to will and not to will. He wills them, however, without any necessity except that which is presupposed, which is the fact of his own immutability.

¹²² Augustine: He calls that the effective or invincible and most omnipotent will of God by which he has decided to reward those who do well and to punish sinners. This will, he says, is always carried out. He calls ineffective (that will) by which he wills that all lead a good life and that no one sins.

¹²³ Gerhard: The antecedent will is that by which God, as our most gracious Father, wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth. The consequent will is that by which God, as the most just judge, wills that those who are impenitent and unbelieving to the end be damned.

¹²⁴ Gerhard: Because in the eternal and most simple will (of God) there is no succession nor distinction of the acts of the will.

¹²⁵ Gerhard: We most emphatically deny, yes, we pronounce that very assumption to be impious and blasphemous, that in those things which concern the matter of salvation a certain secret will which not only differs from the one revealed in the Word but is even contrary to the same must be supposed (to exist).

¹²⁶ Calov: Furthermore, although God permits sin willingly, not unwillingly, nevertheless his will and permission are concerned with different objects; for his will is with reference to permission, but permission is with reference to sin.

iii Formula of Concord, TD, XI: ^{28]} Therefore, if we wish to consider our eternal election to salvation with profit, we must in every way hold sturdily and firmly to this, that, as the preaching of repentance, so also the promise of the Gospel is *universalis* (universal), that is, it pertains to all men, Luke 24, 47 . For this reason Christ has commanded that repentance and remission of sins should be preached in His name among ALL nations . For God loved the WORLD and gave His Son , John 3, 16 . Christ bore the sins of the WORLD , John 1, 29 , gave His flesh for the life of the WORLD , John 6, 51 ; His blood is the propitiation for the sins of the WHOLE WORLD , 1 John 1, 7 ; 2, 2 . Christ says: Come unto Me , ALL ye that labor and are heavy laden , and I will give you rest , Matt. 11, 28 . God hath concluded them ALL in unbelief , that He might have mercy upon ALL , Rom. 11, 32 . The Lord is not willing that ANY should perish , but that ALL should come to repentance , 2 Pet. 3, 9 . The same Lord over all is rich unto ALL that call upon Him , Rom. 10, 12 . The righteousness of God , which is by faith of Jesus Christ , unto ALL and upon ALL them that believe , Rom. 3, 22 . This is the will of Him that sent Me , that EVERY ONE that seeth the Son and believeth on Him may have everlasting life , John 6, 40 . Likewise it is Christ's command that to all in common to whom repentance is preached this promise of the Gospel also should be offered Luke 24, 47 ; Mark 16, 15 .

iv ^{29]} And this call of God, which is made through the preaching of the Word, we should not regard as jugglery, but know that thereby God reveals His will, that in those whom He thus calls He will work through the Word, that they may be enlightened, converted, and saved. For the Word, whereby we are called, is a ministration of the Spirit, that gives the Spirit, or whereby the Spirit is given, 2 Cor. 3, 8 , and a power of God unto salvation, Rom. 1, 16 . And since the Holy Ghost wishes to be efficacious through the Word, and to strengthen and give power and ability, it is God's will that we should receive the Word, believe and obey it.

v ^{33]} With this revealed will of God we should concern ourselves, follow and be diligently engaged upon it, because through the Word, whereby He calls us, the Holy Ghost bestows grace, power, and ability to this end, and should not attempt to sound the abyss of God's hidden predestination, as it is written in Luke 13, 24 , where one asks: "Lord , are there few that be saved ?" and Christ answers: "Strive to enter in at the narrow gate." Accordingly, Luther says [in the Preface to the Epistle to the Romans]: Follow the Epistle to the Romans in its order , concern yourself first with Christ and His Gospel , that you may recognize your sins and His grace; next , that you contend with sin, as Paul teaches from the first to the eighth chapter; then , when in the eighth chapter you will have been exercised by temptation under the cross and afflictions, this will teach you in the ninth , tenth , and eleventh chapters how consolatory predestination is, etc.

Week Ten

vi The Creed of Athanasius. Written against the Arians. 1] Whosoever will be saved, before all things it is necessary that he hold the Catholic faith. 2] Which faith except every one do keep whole and undefiled, without doubt he shall perish everlastingly. 3] And the Catholic faith is this, that we worship one God in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity; 4] Neither confounding the Persons, nor dividing the Substance. 5] For there is one Person of the Father, another of the Son, and another of the Holy Ghost. 6] But the Godhead of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost is all one: the glory equal, the majesty coeternal.

vii 15] So the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God. 16] And yet they are not three Gods, but one God. 17] So likewise the Father is Lord, the Son Lord, and the Holy Ghost Lord. 18] And yet not three Lords, but one Lord. 19] For like as we are compelled by the Christian verity to acknowledge every Person by Himself to be God and Lord, So are we forbidden by the catholic religion to say, There be three Gods, or three Lords.

viii 20] The Father is made of none: neither created nor begotten. 21] The Son is of the Father alone; not made, nor created, but begotten. 22] The Holy Ghost is of the Father and of the Son: neither made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding. 23] So there is one Father, not three Fathers; one Son, not three Sons; one Holy Ghost, not three Holy Ghosts. 24] And in this Trinity none is before or after other; none is greater or less than another; 25] But the whole three Persons are coeternal together, and coequal: so that in all

things, as is aforesaid, the Unity in Trinity and the Trinity in Unity is to be worshiped. 26] He, therefore, that will be saved must thus think of the Trinity.

¹²⁷ Chemnitz: The church, therefore, by the term “essence” understands not a universal term, as the philosophers speak of the human essence, but the divine Essence which actually exists, which is communicable and common to the three Persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and is in each one in its entirety.

¹²⁸ Gerhard: The essence of men is a universal term (i.e., an abstraction) which does not in itself have an actual existence but is arrived at only by a thinking process and is grasped by the mind. The essence of the Godhead, however, is not something abstract (i.e., existing only in the mind), like a genus or species, but it actually exists, although it is communicable.

¹²⁹ Baier: By the term “essence” or οὐσίας is understood the divine nature itself as it is in itself in an absolute way and which together with its attributes is most simply one and unique.

¹³⁰ Gerhard: The word οὐσία when used with reference to God signifies the numerically one and indivisible essence common to the three Persons of the Deity, which is not partially in the three Persons in such a way that a part of it is in the Father, a part in the Son, and a part in the Holy Ghost, but because of its infinity and immateriality it is in its entirety in the Father, in its entirety in the Son, and in its entirety in the Holy Ghost.

¹³¹ Chemnitz: Peter, Paul, John are three persons, to whom one human nature is common, but they differ very much as to 1) substance, 2) time, 3) will, 4) power, 5) action.... But in the Trinity the Persons are not distinguished in the way one angel is from another, one man from another man, nor do they differ in respect to time, will, power, action, but in the Persons of the Trinity there is coeternity, one will, one power, one action.

¹³² Quenstedt: (He already refers to Gn 1:2,3) where mention is made of God speaking, of the Word, etc., (and to Ps 33:6) where David designates the Father by the name Jehovah, which in this place is taken in a personal sense and is expressly distinguished from the Word and the Spirit of his mouth.

¹³³ Gerhard: We do not say that there is the same clarity and obviousness in the testimonies about the Trinity in the Old and New Testament, because a clearer revelation of this mystery was reserved for the New Testament.—2. Nor do we mean that in a dispute against a stubborn opponent one should begin with the more obscure statements of the Old Testament. But we assert merely that for supporting the doctrine of the Trinity certain testimonies can and should be brought from the Old Testament, since God from the beginning always revealed himself in such a way that the church at all times so recognized, invoked, and worshiped him—because in one undivided Essence there are three distinct persons.

¹³⁴ Hafenreffer: The plurality in the unity of the Godhead is personal or a plurality of

persons; for the essence of the Deity is indeed one, but there are several persons. And so in the mystery of the Godhead there is indeed one person and another, but not one thing and another. For one person is that of the Father, another that of the Son, another that of the Holy Ghost, but there is not one essence and another essence, but only the one essence of all the persons.

¹³⁵ Quenstedt: A person (in God) is distinguished in one way from the essence, in another way from another person; from the former not in fact, but in thought with a basis in fact; but from the latter in actual fact, although (in trying to understand this) every function of the human mind comes to a halt.

¹³⁶ Quenstedt: The true and real distinction of the divine persons does not imply a division or multiplication of the divine essence. For God is not divided into three persons, but the three persons, distinct from one another, share without division that one in number, undivided, and infinite essence in such a way that each person has the same essence without any multiplication or division of it. For in this mystery there is one and another as far as the persons are concerned, but not one and another as far as the essence is concerned. And so those three actually distinct persons are and remain identical in essence.

¹³⁷ Gerhard: We speak of God as triune, but we are prohibited by the Christian religion from speaking of him as threefold.

Week Eleven

¹³⁸ Quenstedt: This generation of the Son does not take place by derivation or transfusion, nor by an action which begins or ends, but takes place by way of an unceasing emanation, to which nothing similar can be found in the realm of nature. For God the Father has from eternity begotten and ever begets and will never cease to beget his Son. For if the generation of the Son would have an end, it would also have a beginning, and thus would not be eternal. And nevertheless this generation can not on this account be called imperfect or progressive, for the act of generation in the Father and the Son is considered perfect in respect to the action, perpetual in respect to the activity.

¹³⁹ Hollaz: Spiration is understood not as something external, such as the breathing of Christ on his disciples was, but as something internal and immanent, since it takes place within the bosom of the Deity; not as something transitory and evanescent, as is the breathing of men, but eternal and permanent, because the Holy Spirit proceeds from eternity ...; not an accidental but an essential spiration.

¹⁴⁰ Hollaz: Passive spiration or the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, i.e., the eternal origin of the Holy Spirit, by which he is brought forth within the bosom of the Deity by the Father and the Son as the common breath of both by a communication of the essence which is one and the same in number.

¹⁴¹ Hollaz: It is called passive spiration not in a physical sense, as if it implied a passive power or imperfection, but in a grammatical sense, because the Holy Spirit is not said to breathe forth but to be breathed forth. Nor are the active and passive spiration two spirations, but it is one and the same spiration, which with reference to the breathing and producing principle is called active spiration, with reference to the final product is called passive. In other respects it is the purest emanation of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son.

¹⁴² Axiom of the Dogmaticians: What being begotten, what proceeding (actually) is, I confess I do not know.

¹⁴³ Quenstedt: Divine actions pertaining to the inner relation (of the persons in the Trinity) are personal, which are directed toward God himself in such a way that, nevertheless, they do not recognize as the originator of the action the divine essence, inasmuch as this is common to all three persons, but insofar as it is determined by certain characteristics and personal peculiarities. Consequently, these personal activities pertaining to the inner relation are divided, i.e., they are not common to the three persons but peculiar to only one person or two persons. The activities in relation to the outside world are undivided or common.

¹⁴⁴ The activities in relation to the outside world are undivided or common.

¹⁴⁵ Gerhard: In activities pertaining to the outside world and with respect to the creatures, when only one person is mentioned, or two, the whole Trinity is meant.

¹⁴⁶ Quenstedt: From the real difference of the persons arises their order, both in their (personal) subsistence and in their activity. Nevertheless, a distinction must be made between an order 1) of nature, 2) of time, 3) of rank, 4) of origin and relation. Among the persons of the Godhead there is no order of nature (essence), because they are ὁμοούσιοι (identical in substance), of the same nature and essence; nor of time, since they are ὁμαιώνιοι, co-eternal; nor of rank, since they are ἰσότιμοι (equal in glory), of the same honor; but there is among them an order of origin and relation, since the Father is from no one, the Son is from the Father, and the Holy Spirit is from both.

¹⁴⁷ Hollaz: God the Father is the first person of the Deity, neither begotten nor proceeding, but from eternity begetting the Son, his own substantial image, and with the Son breathing forth the Holy Spirit; creating, preserving, and governing all things, sending the Son as the Redeemer and the Holy Spirit as the Sanctifier of the human race. The Son is the second person of the Deity, begotten of the Father from eternity, of the same essence and majesty with the Father, who with the Father from eternity breathes forth the Holy Spirit and in the fullness of time assumed a human nature into his own person in order that he might redeem and save the human race. The Holy Spirit is the third person of the Deity, of the same essence with the Father and the Son, who from eternity proceeds from the Father and the Son and is sent by both to sanctify the hearts of men who are to be saved.

¹⁴⁸ Hafenreffer: Can not this plurality of the unity nevertheless be illustrated at least to some extent by certain analogies or very crude sketches? Nothing can be found in the whole universe of things which expresses the mystery of the Deity who is to be worshiped. For God, the Creator, transcends his creatures by immeasurable degrees of difference.... In all these analogies, however, there are by far greater differences than similarities: for there is nothing in heaven or on earth which can reflect the nature of the infinite God, nor is there any word or concept which can express so great a mystery adequately.

¹⁴⁹ Gerhard: The analogies a) only illustrate, they do not prove. b) There is more dissimilarity in them than similarity. c) They are sought a posteriori, not a priori (after the truth has been learned, not before). They are not the parents of understanding but the offspring. They do not lead to understanding, but they are adduced to represent what has been understood. d) One must use them soberly and cautiously. e) They cannot be used against an opponent; they can only delight a believer.

¹⁵⁰ Augustine: In short, human speech labors under a great inadequacy. Nevertheless, we speak of three persons, not that that adequately expresses the truth, but so as not to pass over the matter in complete silence. For the ineffable grandeur of the subject cannot be explained by this term.

¹⁵¹ Chemnitz: First of all this offends many, also in ancient times, that the church in speaking about the article of the Trinity was not content with that simple propriety which the Son of God himself used in revealing the doctrine of God and which the Holy Spirit followed in the (writings of the) prophets and apostles, but introduced into the church foreign terms from the impious schools of the heathen. For there is no doubt whatsoever that those words were generally used in the schools of the philosophers. And with great malice the orthodox Fathers were harassed by the heretics with this specious pretext that, namely, the church ought not to think otherwise about that inaccessible light of the Deity than the Deity itself, coming forth from the hidden seat of its majesty, revealed (about) itself... : Therefore the Church would have preferred to use that simplicity of speech, so that, just as it believes, so also it speaks, that there is one God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. But controversies arose with heretics, who were attacking partly the unity of God, partly the Trinity, but so slyly that when they confessed that there is one God, they understood it in such a way that, although there are more gods, nevertheless they are called one just as the heart of the believers is called one (Ac 4:32)... Because, therefore, the heretics were speaking (the same language) with the church, and nevertheless had a different opinion, and through ambiguous terminology, as (Gregory of) Nazianz says, secretly spread poison among the inexperienced who suspected nothing evil when they heard those heretics speak with the same words which the church used, the church men tried to find words in Scripture with which they might draw out from their ambush the hiding heretics so that they would not be able to deceive the incautious with ambiguous terms.

Week Twelve

^{ix} Large Catechism, the First Article: Article I. 9] I believe in God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth. 10] This portrays and sets forth most briefly what is the essence, will, activity, and work of God the Father. For since the Ten Commandments have taught that we are to have not more than one God, the question might be asked, What kind of a person is God? What does He do? How can we praise, or portray and describe Him, that He may be known? Now, that is taught in this and in the following article, so that the Creed is nothing else than the answer and confession of Christians arranged with respect to the First Commandment. As if you were to ask a little child: 11] My dear, what sort of a God have you? What do you know of Him? he could say: This is my God: first, the Father, who has created heaven and earth; besides this only One I regard nothing else as God; for there is no one else who could create heaven and earth.

^x 12] But for the learned, and those who are somewhat advanced these three articles may all be expanded and divided into as many parts as there are words (in the Creed). But now for young scholars let it suffice to indicate the most necessary points, namely, as we have said, that this article refers to the Creation: that we emphasize the words: Creator of heaven and earth. 13] But what is the force of this, or what do you mean by these words: I believe in God, the Father Almighty, Maker, etc.? Answer: This is what I mean and believe, that I am a creature of God; that is, that He has given and constantly preserves to me my body, soul, and life, members great and small, all my senses, reason, and understanding, and so on, food and drink, clothing and support, wife and children, domestics, house and home, etc.

^{xi} 14] Besides, He causes all creatures to serve for the uses and necessities of life sun, moon, and stars in the firmament, day and night, air, fire, water, earth, and whatever it bears and produces, birds and fishes beasts, grain, and all kinds of produce, 15] and whatever else there is of bodily and temporal goods, good government, peace, security. 16] Thus we learn from this article that none of us has of himself, nor can preserve, his life nor anything that is here enumerated or can be enumerated, however small and unimportant a thing it might be, for all is comprehended in the word *Creator*. 17] Moreover, we also confess that God the Father has not only given us all that we have and see before our eyes, but daily preserves and defends us against all evil and misfortune, averts all sorts of danger and calamity; and that He does all this out of pure love and goodness, without our merit, as a benevolent Father, who cares for us that no evil befall us. 18] But to speak more of this belongs in the other two parts of this article.

¹⁵² Hollaz: The work of creation is ascribed particularly to God the Father in Holy Writ and the Apostles' Creed a) because of the order of operation; because the Father has it from himself that he acts and creates, the Son of God and the Holy Spirit (have it) from the Father; b) because God the Father manifested his omnipotence by his most efficacious word of command in the work of creation (*Gn 1:3*); c) creation is the first divine *opus ad extra* [work outside the Godhead, in distinction to the divine acts within the Trinity; redemption and sanctification are the next in order], and therefore it is ascribed to the first person of the Deity through a certain appropriateness. The three

persons of the Deity are not three associate causes, not three authors of creation, but one cause, one author of creation, one Creator.—Although there are three distinct persons, nevertheless they enter into the work of creation with one force. If they entered into it with different working forces, they would be associate causes.

¹⁵³ Hollaz: Creation is a free divine act because God established this universe without being moved by any necessity, as if he actually needed the service of creatures, since he is absolutely self-sufficient, but freely, so that he would have been able to create or not create, to create either sooner or later, in this way or some other way.

¹⁵⁴ Quenstedt: There is no *materia ex qua* [a philosophical term meaning the material which is used in making something] of creation with reference to the things created on the first day. For the things that were created on the first day were not made from pre-existent or previously created material, but they were made from purely negative nothing [i.e., God used absolutely nothing to begin his work of creation].—When it is said that the works of the first day were created out of nothing, the particle *ex* does not designate the *materia ex qua*, but excludes it. For nothing else is meant by the term *ex nihilo* than the *terminus a quo* [a philosophical term meaning the starting point]; that is, the “nothing” from which all things are said to have been made does not define the material but only the *terminus a quo* and ought to be understood concerning the order of creation, and the particle *ex* could rightly be rendered with *post* (after), as Thomas observes, so that the sense is: after nothing as the *terminus a quo* something was made.

¹⁵⁵ Calov: Creation does not consist in an emanation from the essence of God, nor in generation, nor even in a movement or natural change ... but in an external action by which things were produced from nothing by an infinite power.

¹⁵⁶ Chemnitz: One must not dispute, however, with too much curiosity about the difference of the persons in the work of creation, but let us be content with that revelation of the Holy Spirit (Ro 11:36). These facts must not be adduced for an inequality of persons, however, as the Arians blasphemously claim that the Son was (merely) an instrument of God in creation, as a carpenter uses an ax. For these prepositions (ἐκ, διά, εἰς) do not divide the nature, but express the peculiarities of the one unconfused nature.

¹⁵⁷ Hollaz: God did not create this visible world from his own essence, nor did he pour it (i.e., his essence) out into parts as it were, so that any creature might be called a part of the Deity.

¹⁵⁸ Gerhard: Away with the silly dreams of the Stoics, who imagine (that there are) two eternal principles, νοῦν and ὕλην, mind or God and matter, which they dream existed in eternal times as a confused chaos and at a certain time was finally given form by the mind.

¹⁵⁹ Augustine: Without any doubt the world was not made in time but together with time.

¹⁶⁰ Calov: The creation of things was not made from eternity, but in that beginning in

which all time began to flow.

¹⁶¹ Quenstedt: That which cannot exist except after non-existence cannot exist from eternity; but no creature can exist except after non-existence; for to be created is to be produced from nothing. Therefore [the creature cannot exist from eternity].—That which exists from eternity, that exists without a beginning of itself. The creature, however, whenever it is created, itself comes into being, because every effect, when it is produced by its own cause, comes about and receives its existence from that same (cause). But when the creature comes into being, it begins to exist. But if it begins to exist, it was not able to exist from eternity. For (these ideas) are contradictory: to exist with a beginning of itself and not to exist with a beginning of itself.

¹⁶² Hafenreffer: From these things it appears that in the creation of the world there was a threefold operation of the Maker. 1) First, to be sure, he created, that is, when no material existed beforehand, he produced from nothing that crude and shapeless corporeal mass which Moses designated by the names of heaven and earth and water. 2) Then, in the first three days he separated these three bodies. 3) Finally, in the next three days he perfected everything with its own decoration.

¹⁶³ Gerhard: Creation is an act of the one and only God, and an undivided work of the three persons of the Deity, by which the Father through the co-eternal Son in the co-eternal Holy Spirit, of his free will on six distinct days created all things visible and invisible, not out of some material co-existing with them from eternity, but out of nothing, for the glory of his name and the use of man. And all things which God made are very good.

Week Thirteen

¹⁶⁴ Cicero: Since therefore the mind of the world (*i.e.*, God) is of this kind, and for this reason it may rightly be called *prudentia* (foresight) or *providentia* (providence), for in Greek it is called *πρόνοια*.

¹⁶⁵ Calov: Divine government or providence follows the creation of created things, by which he (God) preserves and rules the whole world. (Then he gives the definition:) Divine providence is an activity of God by which according to his will he freely, wisely, and powerfully preserves and governs all things and the individual things to the praise of his glory. (Then he describes the essence of providence as follows:) To explain the essence of providence three things are pertinent: 1) *πρόγνωσις*, or foresight, or foreknowledge; 2) *πρόθεσις*, or the arrangement, purpose, or decree of God; 3) *διοίκησις*, or administration.

¹⁶⁶ Heerbrand: (Providence) is an activity of God by which he not only discerns all things and foresees things that are in the future as far as we are concerned, but also preserves and governs the whole nature of things which he has created and provides all necessary things for the human race, but especially for his church, and then also for the rest of the

creatures. (Later he mentions the effects of providence and enumerates as such on p. 89:) The government and administration and preservation of all things, of men and of other things. (On p. 90 he then enumerates the synonyms of providence and mentions as such *praescientia* (foreknowledge) and *praedestinatio* (predestination)).

¹⁶⁷ Hafenreffer: (Providence) is the activity of God who knows and sees all things by which without intermission he paternally preserves, cares for, fosters, governs, and controls all things created by him and the course of the whole universe, graciously promoting all good things, but severely checking evil things and wisely directing them to good ends.

¹⁶⁸ Baier: And divine providence denotes not only an act of intelligence by which God knows how to arrange and bestow those things which are conducive to preserving the things created by him in their being and leading them to their purposes, but it is also an act of the will by which he wills and decrees to preserve and govern the creatures according to that knowledge of his.

¹⁶⁹ Quenstedt: And so although divine providence presupposes πρόγνωσις or foreknowledge and πρόθεσις or the decree of providing made from eternity, nevertheless it itself properly and essentially consists in διοικήσει or the actual preservation and governing of created things.

¹⁷⁰ Hoffmann: And in reference to πρόγνωσις it must be noted indeed partly that it is attributed to God only anthropopathically and with respect to us who live in time and measure things according to earlier and later; but God sees all things as present, as it were, and looks at them in a perpetual, stable, and immutable now (νῦν).

¹⁷¹ Jerome: The foreknowledge of future things does not make immutable what God knows as future. For not because God knows future things is it necessary that we do that which he foreknew; but that which we are going to do of our own will he knows as future.... It is one thing when I say that with respect to divine foreknowledge something is immutable or will necessarily happen. But it is another thing when I say that a thing is immutable on account of the foreknowledge of God, or, which is the same, that (God's) foreknowledge makes the foreknown things necessary.... In this respect it is rightly said: foreknown things happen in the way they are foreknown, not casually with respect to foreknowledge, as if this makes the foreknown things happen in this way and no other; but only conditionally, in so far as God has foreknown things in no other way than as they will happen from their own proper causes and indeed freely. Now therefore when something happens in this way, it is rightly said that it could not happen in another way with respect to divine foreknowledge; according to the common rule: everything which is, when it is, must then necessarily be.

¹⁷³ Hoffmann: For of whatever kind the διοίκησις (execution) is in time, of that kind also the πρόθεσις is in eternity because of the most exact harmony and conformity of both, namely, of the decree and the execution (διοίκησις). Therefore, just as God in time

governs the actions of men in such a way that he commands, approves, and assists the good actions, but does not command or approve the bad actions, but permits them because of the good outcome which he knows how to draw out of them, and thus, as Augustine says, nothing happens visibly and perceptibly which is not ordered or permitted by the sensible and intelligent court of the highest ruler.

¹⁷⁴ Baier: Opinions differ inasmuch as some contend that not so much the immanent acts of the divine mind and will as the outward acts themselves of preserving and governing are signified by the term “providence”; others indeed teach that the immanent act is denoted by this term. They believe, moreover, that it pertains to the intellect essentially, to the will consequently; others (believe) vice versa. Nevertheless, it is easily recognized that this whole controversy is not so much about the matter itself as about the terms.

¹⁷⁵ Hoffmann: (*Sc.* πρόθεσις, decree), however, is taken here not in a special sense concerning God's purpose with respect to our salvation, as it is taken in Rom.8:28; Eph.1:11; for in this way it is considered in the chapter on predestination, but in a general sense, as it includes all things which are subject to (God's) providence.

¹⁷⁶ Cicero: The gods take care of the big things, they neglect the little things.

¹⁷⁷ Gerhard: Those very things which are preserved and ruled by nature are a witness of divine providence. If you wish to be a disciple of nature, you will find that the most vile and least things are taken care of no less than the most noble; that the things they need are given to all to the end (of their life); that all things continue to exist in a definite and wonderful order; that those things which act without sense and thought nevertheless reach their goal; that those things which fight with one another are tempered in such a way that, by breaking their powers in turn, they benefit the world by their struggle.—But that knowledge of divine providence sought from the book of nature is weak and imperfect, not because of some fault of nature itself but of our mind. More certain and more perfect, however, is that knowledge of providence which is sought from the book of Scripture.

¹⁷⁸ Hollaz: God preserves the species and the individuals. He preserves the species by protecting the essences of things from destruction and by giving them the ability to continue. He preserves the individual by substituting new ones to take the place of those that die so that the essence of the species continues. (*N.B.* Hollaz is confusing the preservation of individuals with that of the species.)

¹⁷⁹ Hoffmann: For just as God is everywhere by (his) essence and permeates all things, and intimately penetrates the individual essences of created things; so by this penetration and influx the individual things are sustained and preserved in their being; and as the existence of the rays (of the sun) is dependent on the sun, so also the existence of the creatures is dependent on the preservation of God through a continuous, direct, and positive influx. If this were withdrawn even for a moment, they would not be able to exist. And indeed (this influx is) not only general but special, or rather particular, by which he preserves each and every thing, not only the classes and species of things, but also the individuals by touching them directly by his own action and not only through the power implanted by him or left in effect.

¹⁸⁰ Hollaz: Divine preservation is not a merely negative or indirect act; for it does not consist in this that God does not wish to destroy or annihilate the things he has created, but to leave them by their own strength, in so far as they are able to thrive and continue from the power given to them through creation; but it is a positive and direct act, by which God in the nature of an efficient cause by a true and real influx flows into the essence of the thing which is to be preserved, so that they persist and remain in nature by their own properties and powers.

Week Fourteen

¹⁸¹ Quenstedt: God preserves all things by a continuation of the action by which he produced things at first. For the preservation of a thing is properly nothing else than its continued production, nor do they differ except by a certain outward terminology.

¹⁸² Hoffmann: This (preservation) is nothing else than a continued creation.

¹⁸³ Gerhard: Preservation is the continuation of existence.... It is a continuous influx of divine power, as it were, which preserves all things, (an influx) into all existing things; if it were withdrawn even for a moment, they would not be able to act, yes, not to exist.

¹⁸⁴ Calov: (Preservation is) an external activity of God by which he sustains all things which exist by a decision of his own will, ... as God is everywhere in his essence and permeates everything, and intimately enters into the individual beings, so by this penetration and influx they are sustained and preserved.

¹⁸⁵ Heraclitus: The universe flows along like a river.

¹⁸⁶ Quenstedt: The question here is not whether God gives the power of acting to secondary causes and preserves it; for this way of cooperating attributes no more to God than that he preserves the essence of things and their ability to act which he gave them in the beginning. But this is the question, whether God influences the action of secondary causes directly and with the action the effect as such according to the need of each one. Divine omnipresence coincides with divine cooperation as far as the thing is concerned.

¹⁸⁷ Quenstedt: Concerning the cooperation of the primary cause (*i.e.*, God) with secondary causes it must be noted 1) that God not only gives the power to act to secondary causes and preserves it (to which alone Durandus, Taurellus, certain papists and Arminians allocate the whole cooperation of God), but that he influences the action and effect of the creature directly, in such a way that the same effect is produced not by God alone, nor by the creature alone, nor partly by God, partly by the creature, but with one and the same efficacy it is produced in its entirety at one and the same time by God and the creature, by God namely as the universal and first cause, by the creature as the particular and secondary cause. Therefore, if God should withdraw his cooperation, the action of the creature would cease, as was apparent in the Babylonian fire (*Dn 3:27*). And about this he (Quenstedt) says further: The influence of God is not in fact one action, the work of the creature another, but the action is one and indivisible, in respect to both and dependent on both, on God as the universal cause, on the creature as the particular cause. He illustrates the matter by the following comparison: Just as one and the same writing depends on the hand and the pen, not one part on the hand and another on the pen, but the

whole (depends) on the hand and the whole on the pen, so the cooperation of God is not prior to the particular action of the creature by a priority of causality, since it is in reality entirely one and the same action. And therefore God produces the whole effect, just as the secondary cause also (does), because it takes place through the outward action of God, which is intimately included in the action of the creature, yes, is one and the same with it.

¹⁸⁸ 1. God cooperates with secondary causes according to their nature; with free ones (he cooperates) freely, with necessary ones necessarily, with strong ones strongly, *etc.* 2. God cooperates in the outward action, not in the essence (*i.e.*, the moral quality) (of the action).

¹⁸⁹ Hutter: Contingent is defined to be that which when it happens is neither impossible nor necessary, but has a cause which from its own nature could act otherwise, as is the will of man. Or, as others define it, contingent is that which could be this way or that way, or which could happen or not happen, and before it happens can be prevented from happening; but when it happens, it has a cause which from its own nature was able to act otherwise and whose opposite would not have been impossible.—The betrayal of Judas with respect to divine providence is called necessary by a necessity of consequence, because God certainly foresaw from eternity that Judas with determined malice and a definite plan would betray Christ. But it was contingent in so far as he would have been able to resist the evil desires of his will and not betray Christ. Because God certainly did not foresee those things otherwise than as they were going to happen from their own causes; therefore they also happen just as God has foreseen them.

¹⁹⁰ Hollaz: Those who teach a preceding cooperation are guilty of a contradiction in terms. For if God cooperates, he does not operate in advance; if he works along, he does not work beforehand. A pre-motion is an antecedent act. But cooperation does not precede but takes place when the action itself is produced.

¹⁹¹ God cooperates with respect to the outward act, not with respect to the essence (*i.e.*, with ethical quality) of an evil action.

¹⁹² God cooperates with respect to the effect, not the defect of an action.

¹⁹³ Quenstedt: The effects of secondary causes are not properly produced by the secondary causes (*i.e.*, by the causes as such), but they are brought about by God alone in the presence of the secondary things, which themselves do nothing.

¹⁹⁴ Baumgarten: The general cooperation of God in all actions of created things consists in this that God maintains their powers.

¹⁹⁵ Leidener Synopsis: It follows that there is no freedom of will in creatures which does not have its origin in the first proper cause of all freedom.

¹⁹⁶ Hottinger: God does not cooperate with the human will only with a general and unspecific influence, but with a special and determining influence.

¹⁹⁷ Calvin: He foresees the things that are future for no other reason than that he has decreed that they happen.

¹⁹⁸ Hollaz: Divine permission ... is a negative act consisting in the withholding or

suspension of an insurmountable obstacle. God could indeed restrain or coerce the sinner by placing in his way a powerful and invincible obstacle; but the most holy God has most just causes for permitting sin.

¹⁹⁹ Quenstedt: God indeed permits but he does not will what he has permitted, which happens, not indeed with God being absolutely unwilling, that is, restraining and hindering it, but nevertheless not willing it. The not-hindering of God is not a willing, but a permitting, and at the same time also a not-willing, in so far as the things which he permits seriously displease him.

²⁰⁰ Gerhard: God does not will sin, and nevertheless he does not prevent it, which is permission itself. But although he permits it willingly, not unwillingly, nevertheless permission and will are directed toward different objects: permission refers to the sin itself, will to the useful end which he according to his own wisdom knows how to draw out of it (i.e., the sin).

²⁰¹ Hollaz: Divine permission is not a pleasant indulgence, as if God plainly does not care when men commit evil acts. Nor is it a relaxation of the law, as though he gives men license to sin; nor is it impotence in God or a lack of knowledge, as if he wills or approves of evil; or a lack of power, as if he is unable to restrain sin. Nor does it make God an unconcerned spectator of sins.

²⁰² Quenstedt: Permission is an act of governing providence by which God through obstacles which the finite agent is not able to overcome or which he does not know how to overcome does not restrain rational creatures inclining to sin by their own will from an evil forbidden by the law, but from just causes allows them to plunge into sins.

²⁰³ Quenstedt: God impedes (evil) by withdrawing his cooperation, by strengthening weaker things, but restraining stronger things with divine power. Impeding is an act of governing providence by which God restrains the actions of creatures according to his will, so that they do not produce the result which they would otherwise produce either by the natural or free power of the agent.

²⁰⁴ Quenstedt: God has decreed not to hinder but to permit that they happen.... But he has not decreed that they should do (the evil). A distinction must be made between the preparation and impulse of the ungodly, and the directing of (even) the worst crime to a salutary end. Not the former but the latter must be attributed to God. Direction is an act of governing providence by which God so controls the good actions of creatures that they lead to and are brought to the objective intended by God, but he directs evil actions to a certain end set by him but not seen by sinners and often contrary to their intention.

²⁰⁵ Quenstedt: Determination is an act of governing providence by which God sets certain limits for the powers, actions, and feelings of his creatures within which they are held both as to time as well as to magnitude and degree.